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English summary
English summary
This dissertation is at the crossroads of electricity markets, industrial organi-
zation and real options literature. The main contribution of the dissertation
is to investigate the eﬀects of market power when the strategic producers
own a portfolio of generation technologies and have ability to aﬀect prices
while facing demand or production uncertainties.
The dissertation presents three chapters that deal with the short and long
term impacts of market power in the electricity markets. Speciﬁcally, the ﬁrst
chapter provides a thorough look at the start up and shut down decisions of
the peakload generators and paves way to a better assessment of the extent
of the market power of a strategic ﬁrm. The second chapter shows the signif-
icance of wind power generator ownership on the peakload ﬁrms production
decisions and market outcomes. Finally, the third chapter investigates how
the investment decisions and technology choice diﬀer between ﬁxed and ﬂex-
ible production generators. Overall, this dissertation mainly adopts a real
options methodology where the optimal decisions of the producers have a
direct impact on the electricity prices contrary to the vast majority of the
real options literature.
The ﬁrst chapter studies the eﬀects of operational characteristics of power
plants on optimal dispatch decisions and estimation of market power. Specif-
ically, I give a real options model to show how operational characteristics of
power plants and market uncertainty aﬀect start up and shut down decisions.
I show that in the case of ownership of multiple generation technologies, opti-
mal dispatch decisions cause capacity withholding for the peakload generator
in both the monopoly and the social planner cases. Moreover, the diﬀerence
between the start up trigger prices for the social planner and the marginal
cost reveals signiﬁcant levels of real options premium. Overall, the existence
of signiﬁcant real options premium levels shows that ignoring market un-
certainties and operational characteristics of individual generators, results
in overestimating the extent of market power of the ﬁrms in the industry.
Therefore, I conclude that real options analysis can be an asset for more
accurate investigations and decisions on the exercise of market power.
The second chapter shifts the focus to the ownership of wind generators as
the ﬁxed baseload generation in the ﬁrst chapter is assumed to be replaced
by the stochastic wind generation. Speciﬁcally, this chapter investigates the
short term eﬀects of wind generator ownership by the owners of fossil-fueled
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peakload generators. I show that aggregate wind generator ownership re-
duces the positive impact of the wind generation on the market outcomes
and as a result the total peakload production decreases and the market price
increases. Furthermore, when all wind generators are owned by the peak-
load ﬁrms, the impact of wind generation on the market outcomes vanishes.
Additionally, start up and shut down (suspension) price thresholds are sig-
niﬁcantly higher when the owner of peakload capacity also owns a share of
wind power generators. I also ﬁnd that a feed-in premium support scheme
does not aﬀect the peakload ﬁrms production levels and hence the market
outcomes. However, under a feed-in tariﬀ type of support scheme, there is
an increase in the total production and a decrease in the market price.
The third chapter, coauthored with Rune Ramsdal Ernstsen, compares the
investment timing and the optimal level of investment for a hypothetical mo-
nopolist and a social planner that have a one-time opportunity to invest in
a generator with either ﬁxed or ﬂexible production. It speciﬁcally investi-
gates how the investment triggers, optimal capacities and technology choices
change with the changes to the investment cost function, demand uncertainty
and the level of installed capacity in the market. The main contribution of
this paper is to document that the choice to invest between generators with
ﬁxed or ﬂexible production does not only depend on the diﬀerences in costs
for diﬀerent technologies but also on the diﬀerences in operation of those
technologies.
We ﬁnd that the strategic ﬁrm tends to invest at a higher demand trigger
level and lower capacity compared to the social planner for both the baseload
and the peakload investment cases. Hence, the strategic ﬁrm is expected to
invest at a later date while incurring lower investment costs. Furthermore,
for both the strategic ﬁrm and the social planner, ﬁxed baseload generation
is preferable during low uncertainty cases whereas high uncertainty tends
to result in the choice of ﬂexible peakload generation. We additionally ﬁnd
that highly convex investment costs greatly diminishes the impact of market
power on the investment decisions.
v
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Dansk resume´
Denne afhandling beﬁnder sig i krydsfeltet mellem el-markeder, industriøkonomi
og real optioner. Afhandlingens væsentligste bidrag er at undersøge eﬀekterne af
markedsmagt, n˚ar strategiske producenter r˚ader over en portefølje af
produktionsteknologier og kan p˚avirke prisen samtidig med at der er usikker-
hed om efterspørgsel eller produktion.
Afhandlingen indeholder tre kapitler, som behandler kort- og langsigtede
eﬀekter af markedsmagt i el- markeder. Det første kapitel omhandler en grundig
analyse af beslutningerne om at starte og slukke spidsbehandlingsan-læg og
baner vejen for en bedre vurdering af den strategiske virksomheds
markedsmagt. Det andet kapitel viser betydningen for spidsbelastningspro-
duktionen og for markedsligevægten af, at spidsbelastningsproducenter ogs˚aejer
vindproduktion. Det tredje kapitel undersøger, hvordan investeringsbeslut-
ninger og teknologivalg bliver p˚avirket af, om produktionsteknologierne er
ﬂeksible eller ej. I modsætning til hovedparten af litteraturen er afhandlingen
overordnet bygget over en real-optionsmetode, hvor producenternes optimale
beslutninger p˚avirker elpriserne.
Det første kapitel undersøger eﬀekterne af elværkernes operationelle karakter-
istika p˚ade optimale opstartsbeslutninger og p˚aberegningen af
markedsmagt. Speciﬁkt opstiller jeg en real-optionsmodel for at vise, hvordan
elværkernes operationelle karakteristika og usikkerhed om markedet p˚avirker
beslutninger om at starte eller slukke dem. Jeg viser, at hvis el-producenten ejer
ﬂere forskellige teknologier til el-produktion, s˚avil optimale
opstartsbeslutninger for˚arsage kapacitetsbegrænsning b˚ade for en
monopolist og for en samfund-splanlægger, som maksimerer den samlede
velfærd. Derudover kan forskellen mellem de priser, der udløser at værket bliver
startet op, og marginalomkost-ningen i betydelig grad forklares med et real-
options tillæg. Overordnet set viser eksistensen af betydelige real-options tillæg,
at man kommer til at overvurdere graden af markedsmagt i branchen, hvis man
ikke tager højde for usikkerhed og de individuelle producenters operationelle
karakteristika. P˚ aden baggrund konkluderer jeg, at real-options-analyse kan
være et ak-tiv i forhold til mere præcise undersøgelser og beslutninger om
udøvelse af markedsmagt.
Det andet kapitel skifter fokus til ejerskab af vindproduktion, idet den faste
grundlastproduktion, som blev antaget i første kapitel, her erstattes af stokastisk
vindproduktion. Speciﬁkt undersøger dette kapitel de kortsigtede eﬀekter af,
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at ejere af spidslastværker, som benytter sig af fossilt brændstof, ogs˚aejer vin-
dproduktion. Jeg viser, at aggregeret ejerskab til vindproduktion reducerer
den positive p˚avirkning, som vindproduktion har p˚amarkedsligevægten, og at
den totale spidslastproduktion falder, samtidig med at markedsprisen stiger.
Derudover viser jeg, at n˚ar al vindproduktion ejes af spidslastproducenter,
s˚aforsvinder eﬀekten af vindproduktion p˚amarkedsligevægten. Jo større en
del spidslastproducenterne ejer af vindproduktionen, desto højere er opstarts-
og nedlukningsgrænserne. Jeg ﬁnder ogs˚a, at hvis vindproduktionen støttes
af feed-in premiums, s˚ap˚avirkes spidslastproduktionen og dermed marked-
sligevægten ikke, hvorimod der med en feed-in tariﬀ vil være en stigning i
den samlede produktion og et fald i markedsprisen.
Det tredje kapitel, som er skrevet sammen med Rune Ramsdal Ernstsen, sam-
menligner investeringernes tidsmæssige placering og deres optimale niveau
for henholdsvis en monopolist og en samfundsplanlægger, som har mulighed
for en engangsinvestering i enten fast eller ﬂeksibel produktion. Kapit-
let undersøger speciﬁkt, hvordan de faktorer, som udløser start eller lukn-
ing af spidslastproduktion, de optimale kapaciteter og teknologivalget æn-
drer sig med ændringer i investeringsomkostningsfunktionen, usikkerhed om
efterspørgslen og niveauet for allerede installeret kapacitet i markedet.
Kapitlets væsentligste bidrag er at dokumentere, at valget mellem fast eller
ﬂeksibel produktion ikke kun afhænger af de forskellige teknologiers omkost-
ninger, men ogs˚ap˚aforskelle i deres ma˚de at fungere p˚a. Vi ﬁnder, at den
strategiske producent har en tendens til at investere ved et højere niveau for
efterspørgslen end samfundsplanlæggeren b˚ade for grundlast- og spidslast-
investeringer. Den strategiske producent forventes at investere senere og
til lavere investeringsomkostninger sammenlignet med den samfundsmæs-
sige planlægger. B˚ade den strategiske producent og den samfundsmæssige
planlægger vil foretrække fast grundlastproduktion, n˚ar usikkerheden er lille,
mens stor usikkerhed tenderer til at gøre ﬂeksibel spidslastproduktion til det
optimale valg. Vi ﬁnder endvidere, at stærkt konvekse investeringsomkost-
ninger mindsker markedsmagtens betydning for investeringsbeslutningerne
betragteligt.
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Introduction
Introduction
Eﬀects of uncertainty in the electricity markets have been gaining greater at-
tention especially after intermittent renewable generation technologies have
started to get signiﬁcant shares of production in the electricity markets.
Many uncertainties (cost, demand, production, price etc.) in electricity mar-
kets make the optimal investment and dispatch decisions even more crucial
for the strategic producers. The main contribution of the dissertation is to
investigate the eﬀects of market power when the strategic producers own a
portfolio of generation technologies and have ability to aﬀect prices while
facing demand or production uncertainties.
It is broadly accepted in the ﬁnancial literature that traditional investment
decision making methods (e.g. net present value) are not suﬃcient to capture
the accurate value of an irreversible investment that is subject to uncertain
costs and/or payoﬀs. Hence, ﬁnancial option concept has been applied to
real investments to form a new decision making approach that overcomes this
problem. As detailed in introductory textbooks Dixit and Pindyck (1994)
and Trigeorgis (1996), real options analysis has been used to evaluate a wide
range of investment decisions more accurately. Speciﬁc examples are; eval-
uation of natural resources (Brennan and Schwartz (1985), Paddock et al.
(1988)), real estate developments (Grenadier (1996)), R&D (Miltersen and
Schwartz (2003)) and valuation of power plants (Thompson et al. (1994),
Tseng and Barz (2002)).
In the short term, there are mainly two ways to exercise market power and
inﬂuence electricity prices for strategic ﬁrms. First, ﬁrms can decrease the
level of output by withholding capacity (Joskow and Kahn, 2002). Second,
they expectedly operate their generators for a signiﬁcantly shorter period of
time by asking higher start up and shut down prices than the corresponding
socially optimal case. In the long run, the market power could motivate
strategic ﬁrms to underinvest in generation capacity, delay the investment
decision or choose to invest in a speciﬁc type of technology.
This dissertation presents three chapters that deals with the short and long
term impacts of market power in the electricity markets. All three chapters
have very close setups (in terms of electricity generation portfolio, nature of
the stochastic process, parameter values etc.) to present diﬀerent aspects of
exercise of market power in a simpliﬁed electricity market. This approach
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links all three chapters and helps us to get a relatively uniﬁed picture on
the related short and long term decisions of the strategic ﬁrms. Speciﬁcally,
the ﬁrst chapter provides a thorough look at the start up and shut down
decisions of the peakload generators and paves way to a better assessment
of the extent of the market power of a strategic ﬁrm. The second chapter
shows the signiﬁcance of wind power generator ownership on the peakload
ﬁrms production decisions and market outcomes. Finally, the third chap-
ter investigates how the investment decisions and technology choice diﬀer
between ﬁxed and ﬂexible production generators. Overall, this dissertation
mainly adopts a real options methodology where the optimal decisions of the
producers have a direct impact on the electricity prices contrary to the vast
majority of the real options literature.
The ﬁrst chapter studies the eﬀects of operational characteristics of power
plants on optimal dispatch decisions and estimation of market power. Specif-
ically, I give a real options model to show how operational characteristics of
power plants and market uncertainty aﬀect start up and shut down decisions.
I show that in the case of ownership of multiple generation technologies, opti-
mal dispatch decisions cause capacity withholding for the peakload generator
in both the monopoly and the social planner cases. Moreover, the diﬀerence
between the start up trigger prices for the social planner and the marginal
cost reveals signiﬁcant levels of real options premium. Overall, the existence
of signiﬁcant real options premium levels shows that ignoring market un-
certainties and operational characteristics of individual generators, results
in overestimating the extent of market power of the ﬁrms in the industry.
Therefore, real options analysis can be an asset for more accurate investiga-
tions and decisions on the exercise of market power.
The second chapter shifts the focus to the ownership of wind generators as
the ﬁxed baseload generation in the ﬁrst chapter is assumed to be replaced
by the stochastic wind generation. Speciﬁcally, this chapter investigates the
short term eﬀects of wind generator ownership by the owners of fossil-fueled
peakload generators. I show that aggregate wind generator ownership re-
duces the positive impact of the wind generation on the market outcomes
and as a result the total peakload production decreases and the market price
increases. Furthermore, when all wind generators are owned by the peak-
load ﬁrms, the impact of wind generation on the market outcomes vanishes.
Additionally, start up and shut down (suspension) price thresholds are sig-
niﬁcantly higher when the owner of peakload capacity also owns a share of
2
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wind power generators. I also ﬁnd that a feed-in premium support scheme
does not aﬀect the peakload ﬁrms production levels and hence the market
outcomes. However, under a feed-in tariﬀ type of support scheme, there is
an increase in the total production and a decrease in the market price.
The third chapter, coauthored with Rune Ramsdal Ernstsen, compares the
investment timing and the optimal level of investment for a hypothetical mo-
nopolist and a social planner that have a one-time opportunity to invest in
a generator with either ﬁxed or ﬂexible production. It speciﬁcally investi-
gates how the investment triggers, optimal capacities and technology choices
change with the changes to the investment cost function, demand uncertainty
and the level of installed capacity in the market. The main contribution of
this paper is to document that the choice to invest between generators with
ﬁxed or ﬂexible production does not only depend on the diﬀerences in costs
for diﬀerent technologies but also on the diﬀerences in operation of those
technologies.
We ﬁnd that the strategic ﬁrm tends to invest at a higher demand trigger level
and lower capacity compared to the social planner for both the baseload and
peakload investment cases. Hence, the strategic ﬁrm is expected to invest
at a later date while incurring lower investment costs. Furthermore, for
both the strategic ﬁrm and the social planner, ﬁxed baseload generation is
preferable during low uncertainty cases whereas high uncertainty tends to
result in the choice of ﬂexible peakload generation. We additionally ﬁnd
that highly convex investment costs greatly diminishes the impact of market
power on the investment decisions. We also ﬁnd that with increased levels of
installed capacity and installed capacity ownership, the strategic ﬁrm delays
the new investment and increases the new investment capacity.
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Abstract
In this paper, I study the eﬀects of operational characteristics of power plants
on optimal dispatch decisions and estimation of market power. I give a real
options model to show how operational characteristics of power plants and
market uncertainty aﬀect start up and shut down decisions. In the model,
the industry adjusts its production or take start up and shut down decisions
for power plants according to realization of industry-wide exogenous demand
shocks. I show that in the case of ownership of multiple generation technolo-
gies, optimal dispatch decisions causes capacity withholding for the peakload
generator in both the monopoly and the social planner cases. Moreover, the
diﬀerence between the start up trigger prices for the social planner and the
marginal cost reveals signiﬁcant levels of real options premia. I further ﬁnd
that real options premium explains more than 24% of the monopolist’s mark-
up. To make use of this ﬁnding, I provide an adjustment to the Lerner Index
by incorporating real options premium into its formula. Furthermore, I show
aAddress: Porcelænshaven 16A, 1 DK-2000, DENMARK, telephone: +45-3815-2340,
e-mail: nm.eco@cbs.dk.
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that ﬂexible peakload generation helps to lower real options premium levels
for the social planner and the extent of market power for the monopolist by
lowering optimal start up trigger levels.
Keywords: Uncertainty, real options, electricity.
JEL Classiﬁcation: D92, L4, L11, L12, L94
1 Introduction and Literature Review
In this paper, I study the eﬀects of operational characteristics of power plants
on optimal dispatch decisions and estimation of market power. I show how
optimal operation of power plants leads to capacity withholding decisions
for both a monopolist and a social planner. In that regard, I combine two
strands of literature. First, the electricity markets literature regarding the
exercise of unilateral market power. Second, the real options literature on
irreversible investment under uncertainty.
In the two strands of literature mentioned above, there is not a theoretical
model showing the eﬀects of operational characteristics of power plants on
capacity withholding decisions. Therefore, the ﬁrst aim of this paper is to
bridge these two strands of literature by giving a theoretical model to show
how market uncertainty and operational characteristics of the power plants
aﬀect the extent of economic capacity withholding. I further compare the
monopolist and social planner cases to provide a more accurate measure for
the extent of market power of the monopolist. To achieve this goal, I calculate
the social planner’s mark-up (prior to starting up its peakload generator) and
isolate it from the corresponding monopolist’s mark-up.
As suggested by Møllgaard and Nielsen (2004), by including demand un-
certainty into the model, I use real options analysis to determine optimal
dispatch decisions of generators facing start up and shut down costs. I ﬁnd
the thresholds where peakload generators start up and shut down (suspend)
production. I interpret the diﬀerence between the start up price threshold
and the marginal cost as a measure of the extent of economic capacity with-
holding. Furthermore I show that, even for the case of social planner, a
certain level of capacity withholding is unavoidable. This result leads to a
reinterpretation of the Lerner Index that takes real options premium into
account.
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Economic capacity withholding can be deﬁned as reducing output by asking
for higher prices or submitting higher bids than the marginal cost of the
generator in question (Twomey et al. (2005)). Harvey and Hogan (2001) de-
scribe the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s (an independent agency
that regulates the interstate transmission of electricity, natural gas, and oil in
the U.S.) economic withholding criterion as; during periods of high demand
and high market prices, all generation capacity whose incremental costs do
not exceed the market price would be either producing energy or supplying
operating reserves.1 They further discuss the eﬀects of start up and min-
imum load costs by noting: In markets in which generators have start-up
costs, minimum load costs and operating ﬂexibilities, conclusions regarding
the exercise of market power cannot be drawn based on a comparison of prices
and incremental costs of oﬀ-line units. As a result, they indicate that even if
price levels are above marginal cost of production, a generator might not be
dispatched because of the existence of start up costs. This is simply because,
marginal costs do not reﬂect the total incremental costs that are incurred
by the ﬁrm to start the production. On this point, Brennan (2003) also un-
derlines that the need to recover ﬁxed costs can lead the prices substantially
above average costs in peak periods.
Focusing on the electricity literature, strategic actions of the producers have
been a long lasting interest of researchers and policy makers. Mainly focused
on the California electricity market crisis in the summer of 2000 Harvey and
Hogan (2001) discuss regulatory and economic aspects of capacity withhold-
ing, Joskow and Kahn (2002) identify the existence of capacity withholding in
certain hours, Borenstein et al. (2002) ﬁnd the existence of anti-competitive
pricing during peak demand hours and Wolak (2003) gives a measure for uni-
lateral market power for the California market using actual submitted bids.
Apart from the California market, Wolfram (1998) studies strategic bidding
behaviours in England and Wales.
On the valuation and optimal operation of generation technologies, Gardner
and Zhuang (2000) study a short term and discrete-time real options model
for power plant valuation under some operational constraints, including start
up costs and minimum generation levels. By using New England power
pool data, they calculate that operating constraints (speciﬁcally, minimum
1Based on this criterion, any generation capacity is considered to be economically
withheld if it has not been dispatched yet while the market price is above its marginal
cost.
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generation levels) can have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on power plant valuation. Deng
and Oren (2003) also use a real options based valuation for power plants
by incorporating start up and shut down costs. They use price and cost
uncertainties in their analysis and conclude that start up costs reduce the
real options-based value of a power plant. Furthermore, they show that,
under the mean-reversion models for prices, ignoring start up costs alone can
explain a sizeable portion of the overstated capacity value of a power plant.
Thompson et al. (2003) also study the valuation and optimal operation of
hydroelectric and thermal power plants. They provide a model determining
the optimal operating strategy of power plants as well as evaluating economic
trade-oﬀs involved in building new facilities.
The model I present is an extension of the existing real options literature
in several ways. In standard real options analysis (speciﬁcally on electric-
ity markets), there is not a paper taking both operational constraints for
power plant operations and endogenous market price mechanisms into ac-
count. Furthermore the existing models are generally based on ownership of
a single power plant under exogenous price processes (e.g., Thompson et al.
(2003)). In the light of existing real options and electricity literatures, I will
give a model that incorporates ownership of multiple generators subject to a
number of operational constraints (total capacity, minimum operation level,
ﬂexibility in production, start up and shut down costs) and ability to aﬀect
market prices with optimal dispatch decisions (start up, shut down decisions
and optimal production levels) in continuous time.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2, I give the aim and
formal set up with a sample deterministic case. In section 3, I provide model
derivations for the monopolist case. In section 4, I adopt the model to the
corresponding social planner’s problem to set a benchmark and distinguish
the eﬀects of market power by calculating the real options premium. In
section 5, I give numerical results to the theoretical derivations of Section 3
and 4. In section 6, I provide a brief conclusion on my ﬁndings.
2 The Aim and Model Set up
In this paper, I present a continuous time real options model as I consider
start up and shut down costs as prospective sunk costs (Pindyck (2008)) and,
as a result, take the partial irreversibility of start up and shut down decisions
8
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into account. In this model, I combine Dixit and Pindyck (1994)’s optimal
switching approach and Hagspiel et.al. (2010)’s ﬂexible production under
uncertainty approach (see also Dangl (1999)). I use this optimal switching
approach to show the eﬀects of start up and shut down costs (alongside total
capacity, production ﬂexibility, minimum operating levels and uncertainty)
on the optimal operation of a peakload generator under the ownership of a
generation portfolio.2 A main property of the model is focusing on ownership
of two diﬀerent generation technologies either by the monopolist or by a social
planner. I make this assumption to investigate a more realistic scenario than
the existing real options models in the literature since ownership of multiple
generation technologies is a common feature in the electricity industries.
The industry consists of two types of electricity generation technologies. For
simpliﬁcation, I assume that there is only one baseload (B) and one peakload
(P ) generation unit. I will investigate the cases for both ﬂexible and inﬂexible
peakload generation. Furthermore in this model, optimal switching means
utilizing only the baseload generator or switching on the peakload generator
to utilize both of them. In other words, switching on the peakload generator
does not mean shutting down the baseload generator.
Each generation unit is characterized by (Ki, Ii, Ei, ci, qi) for i = B,P ; where
generation units have maximum capacity Ki, start up cost Ii, shut down
(suspension of production) cost Ei and constant marginal cost of production
ci.
3 In addition, in the case of ﬂexible production, qi shows the minimum
possible operation level of the active generator i. Therefore, at each instant
in time, the production level qi(t) of the active ﬂexible generator i satisﬁes:
0 ≤ qi ≤ qi(t) ≤ Ki.4
Generators have inﬁnite lifetime and they are diﬀerentiated such that IB > IP
and cP > cB = 0. This assumption is in line with the electricity literature
where peakload generators are expected to have higher marginal cost and
lower start up cost (e.g. Joskow (2006)). I further assume that there are no
2In this paper, I am not concerned with either the initial investment problem for the
existing generators or investment in new generators.
3Start up and shut down costs may actually depend on several parameters including:
technology, total capacity and total oﬀ/on-time of the generators (Harvey and Hogan
(2001)). However since I assume to have predetermined capacities and technologies, I will
also treat start up and shut down costs as constants.
4Minimum operation level is a technological constraint and could be as small as the
generation technology requires.
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transmission costs and generators can adjust their output without a cost.
The problem is to solve for the optimal operation of the peakload generator
under the ownership of multiple generation technologies. In actual electricity
markets, ﬁrms operate their baseload generators almost throughout the year
without shutting them down and start peakload generators whenever the
market demand is high enough. Since capacity withholding is more likely
to happen using the more expensive peakload generators, I will assume that
the monopolist (or the social planner) always keeps the baseload generator
operational5 and at all times the baseload generator operates at full capacity,
qB(t) = KB.
6 Hence, we focus on the optimal operation of the peakload
generator.
At time t, the monopolist produces Q(t) = KB + qP (t) units of output and
depending on the maximum installed capacity, total industry production
satisﬁes: KB +KP ≥ Q(t) ≥ KB for all t. The price of electricity ﬂuctuates
stochastically according to an inverse demand function:
P (t) = D[X(t), Q(t)] (1)
where D : R+ → R is a twice continuously diﬀerentiable inverse demand
function with ∂D/∂X > 0 and ∂D/∂Q < 0. To simplify model derivations,
I will further assume to have a linear inverse demand function:
P (t) = X(t)− γQ(t) with γ > 0. (2)
X(t) is the exogenous demand shock following a Geometric Brownian Motion
z 7:
dX(t) = αX(t)dt+ σX(t)dz (3)
5This assumption can also be justiﬁed by very high start up costs for baseload genera-
tors. If the ﬁrm shut downs the baseload generator, it will have to incur a very high start
up cost to restart the generator in the future. Furthermore, zero marginal cost assumption
is also in favour of this assumption.
6The ﬁxed baseload generation assumption can be relaxed to have a ﬂexible baseload
generation for a more realistic scenario but it would also give rise to more complicated
equations without qualitatively changing the results in our basic model.
7Linear demand function and Geometric Brownian Motion assumptions are widely-used
in the electricity real options literature (e.g. Aguerrevere (2005)). Additionally, Marathe
and Ryan (2005) show that the US monthly consumption data of electricity pass the tests
for not contradicting a Geometric Brownian Motion process after deseasonalization.
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where α is the drift paramater, σ is the volatility parameter, dt is the incre-
ment of time and dz is the increment of a Wiener process.
The state of the industry is characterized by [X(t), KB+q
∗
P (t), ω] where q
∗
P (t)
is the optimal level of peakload production at time t and ω is the indication of
whether the peakload generator is active. In general, the peakload generator
will be started when demand is high and it will be shut down when demand
is low enough. Speciﬁcally, in state [X(t), KB, 0] the peakload generator
will be started when X(t) ≥ XH by incurring the start up cost IP . In
state [X(t), KB + q
∗
P (t), 1], the peakload generator will be shut down when
X(t) ≤ XL by incurring the shut down cost EP .
2.1 A Deterministic Case
In this section, I give the evolution of total industry production given a
deterministic evolution of demand shock, X(t). The purpose of this section
is to show how demand aﬀects the optimal operation of a ﬂexible peakload
generator and hence total industry production. I assume that at t = 0, the
baseload generator is being operated at full capacity whereas the peakload
generator has not been started up, yet.
For the sample case given in Figure 1, the demand shock starts at a point
below the start up trigger level of the peakload generator. Afterwards, the
demand shock linearly increases until t = 125. At t = 125 point, it starts
to linearly decrease. Furthermore, I assume that t = 50 is when the demand
shock hits the trigger start up level (XH) whereas t = 200 is when it hits the
trigger shut down demand shock level (XL).
Given this deterministic case, the evolution of the monopolist’s total produc-
tion (under ﬂexible peakload generation) is pictured in Figure 2. Looking
at the Figure 2, one can chronologically observe that:
• The monopolist operates only the baseload generator until the demand
shock hits the start-up trigger when t = 50.
• At t = 50, the monopolist starts up the peakload generator at the
minimum operation level, qP .
• Between t = 50 and t = 100, due to increasing demand, the monop-
olist ﬁrst continues to produce at the minimum operation level and
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Figure 1: Sample Evolution of the Demand Shock X(t).
then keeps increasing the total output by ramping up the peakload
generator.
• At t = 100, the monopolist starts to operate the peakload generator at
full capacity, KP .
• At t = 150, due to declining demand, the monopolist starts to decrease
the production of the peakload generator.
• Between t = 150 and t = 200, due to declining demand, the monopo-
list keeps decreasing the total output until it starts to operate at the
minimum level.
• At t = 200, the monopolist shuts down the peakload generator.
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Figure 2: Sample Evolution of Total Production Q(t) (For qP = 40, KB = 400
and KP = 200)
3 Monopolist Production
The monopolist’s objective is to maximize the total discounted value of its
generation portfolio. To achieve this objective, the monopolist decides when
to optimally start up and shut down peakload production. Therefore, there
will be two possible types of proﬁt ﬂows. First, the proﬁt ﬂow when only the
baseload generator is active, and second, the proﬁt ﬂow when both of the
generators are active. According to the demand shock level, the monopolist
faces start up and shut down costs as well as the cost of electricity production
for its peakload generator. In this section, I will investigate the possible
proﬁt functions and optimal production levels by focusing on ﬂexibility of
the peakload production.
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3.1 Fixed Peakload Generation
In this case, I assume that peakload production is ﬁxed and at full capacity
when it is active. Therefore, total industry production simply depends on
whether the peakload generator is active or not. In that regard, baseload-
only production takes place when demand is low enough and there is no
need for peakload generation. For baseload-only production, when ω = 0,
the proﬁt function of the monopolist is:
ΠB[X(t), KB] = [X(t)− γKB]KB (4)
On the other hand, the peakload generator is started up when demand is
high enough. In that case, when ω = 1, the proﬁt function of the monopolist
is:
ΠB+P [X(t), KB +KP ] = [X(t)− γ(KB +KP )](KB +KP )− cPKP (5)
3.2 Flexible Peakload Generation
In this section, I relax the ﬁxed peakload production assumption. For this
case, baseload-only production still yields the same proﬁt function for the mo-
nopolist as the ﬁxed peakload production case. However, when the peakload
generator is active, the proﬁt function depends on the optimal production of
the peakload generator (which is now ﬂexible). Therefore, the proﬁt function
of the monopolist when the peakload generator is active, ω = 1, is:
ΠB+P [X(t), KB+q
∗
P (t)] = supqP (t){[X(t)−γ(KB+qP (t))](KB+qP (t))−cP qP (t)}
(6)
s.t. qP (t) ≤ qP (t) ≤ KP .
Remark 1. : When the peakload generator is active (i.e., qP (t) > 0) this
state will negatively aﬀect the proﬁts coming from baseload generation since
the price will fall when total market output increases (∂D/∂Q < 0). This
aﬀect is the opportunity cost of starting up the peakload generator.
Depending on demand shock levels, optimal production of the ﬂexible peak-
load generator consists of three parts. First, the peakload generator is oper-
ating at minimum level. Second, the peakload generator is operating between
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minimum and maximum levels. Third, the peakload generator is operating
at full capacity.
Using Equation 6, optimal peakload production levels for the monopolist
are:
q∗P (t) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 if X < XML
qP if X
M > X ≥ XML
X(t)− cP
2γ
−KB if XM > X ≥ XM
KP if X ≥ XM
(7)
where formal deﬁnitions of the trigger demand shock levels: XML , X
M and
X
M
are presented in the following section.
3.3 Real Options Set-up
Given the initial state of the economy, [X0, KB, ω = 0], let V
0[X(t), KB] de-
note the expected net present value of the generation portfolio when the peak-
load generator is idle with optimal future strategies. Similarly, V 1[X(t), KB+
q∗P (t)] is the expected net present value of the generation portfolio when the
peakload generator is active with optimal future strategies. By using dy-
namic programming, V 0[X(t), KB] can be expressed as the sum of the op-
erating proﬁt over the interval (t, t+ dt) and the continuation value beyond
(t, t+ dt), i.e.,
V 0[X(t), KB] = Π
B[X(t), KB]dt+ E
[
e−rdtV 0[X(t) + dX(t), KB]
]
Using standard real options techniques (i.e., using Ito’s Lemma to expand the
right hand side and then neglecting the terms that go to zero), V 0[X(t), KB]
will be the solution to the ordinary diﬀerential equation (see, Dixit and
Pindyck (1994), Chp. 6):
1
2
σ2X(t)2V 0XX + αX(t)V
0
X − rV 0 +ΠB[X(t), KB] = 0 (8)
Similarly, , V 1[X(t), KB + q
∗
P (t)] will be the solution to the ordinary diﬀer-
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ential equation:
1
2
σ2X(t)2V 1XX + αX(t)V
1
X − rV 1 +ΠB+P [X(t), KB + q∗P (t)] = 0 (9)
Since there are diﬀerent proﬁt functions depending on the ﬂexibility of the
peakload generator, the solutions to the above ordinary diﬀerential equations
change with those proﬁt functions. Below, I show how those diﬀerent proﬁt
functions aﬀect the corresponding value functions.
3.3.1 Value Function for Fixed Peakload Generation
Depending on the previously given proﬁt functions, value functions for the
ﬁxed peakload production case are:
V 0 =
{
A1X
β1 + KB
r−αX −
γK2B
r
if X < XMH
F2X
β2 + KB+KP
r−α X − γ(KB+KP )
2+cPKP
r
− IP if X ≥ XMH
and
V 1 =
{
A1X
β1 + KB
r−αX −
γK2B
r
− EP if X ≤ XML
F2X
β2 + KB+KP
r−α X − γ(KB+KP )
2+cPKP
r
if X > XML
Deﬁnition 2. For the monopolist, under ﬁxed peakload production, formal
deﬁnitions of the trigger levels XMH and X
M
L are given by:
XMH = inf
{
X(t)|ω = 0 ∧ V 1[X(t), KB +KP ]− IP ≥ V 0[X(t), KB], ∀t
}
(10)
XML = sup
{
X(t)|ω = 1 ∧ V 0[X(t), KB]− EP ≥ V 1[X(t), KB +KP ], ∀t
}
(11)
By using value matching and smooth-pasting conditions, there will be four
equations and four unknowns (A1, F2, X
M
L and X
M
H ). Given the nature of the
value functions, numerical solutions for the trigger levels XML and X
M
H exist
but they cannot be derived analytically (Dixit 1989). I provide numerical
solutions to this problem in Section 5.
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3.3.2 Value Function for Flexible Peakload Generation
Depending on the previously given proﬁt functions, value functions for the
ﬂexible peakload production case are:
V 0 =
{
A1X
β1 + KB
r−αX −
γK2B
r
if X < XMH
V 1 − IP if X ≥ XMH
and
V 1 =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
A1X
β1 + KB
r−αX −
γK2B
r
− EP if X ≤ XML
C1X
β1 + C2X
β2 + KB+qP
r−α X − γ(KB+qP )
2+cP qP
r
if XM ≥ X > XML
D1X
β1 +D2X
β2 + 1
4γ
[
X2
r−2α−σ2 − 2cPr−αX +
c2P
r
]
+ cPKB
r
if X
M ≥ X > XM
F2X
β2 + KB+KP
r−α X − γ(KB+KP )
2+cPKP
r
if X > X
M
where XM = [2γ(KB + qP ) + cP ] and X
M
= [2γ(KB +KP ) + cP ].
Deﬁnition 3. For the monopolist, under ﬂexible peakload production, formal
deﬁnitions of the trigger levels XMH , X
M
L , X
M and X
M
are given by:
XMH = inf
{
X(t)|ω = 0 ∧ V 1[X(t), KB + qP ]− IP ≥ V 0[X(t), KB], ∀t
}
(12)
XML = sup
{
X(t)|ω = 1 ∧ V 0[X(t), KB]− EP ≥ V 1[X(t), KB + qP ], ∀t
}
(13)
XM = sup
{
X(t)|ω = 1 ∧ ΠB+P [X(t), KB + q∗P (t)] = ΠB+P [X(t), KB + qP ], ∀t
}
(14)
X
M
= inf
{
X(t)|ω = 1 ∧ ΠB+P [X(t), KB + q∗P (t)] = ΠB+P [X(t), KB +KP ], ∀t
}
(15)
By using value matching and smooth-pasting conditions, there will be eight
equations and eight unknowns (A1, C1, C2, D1, D2, F2, X
M
L and X
M
H ). Given
the nature of the value functions, numerical solutions for the trigger levels
XML and X
M
H exist but they cannot be derived analytically. I provide numer-
ical solutions to this problem in Section 5.
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4 Social Planning and Competitive Equilib-
rium
In this section, I investigate the social planner’s problem. The aim is to
show that, with the same set up as the monopolist, the social planner’s
optimal actions result in a certain level of economic capacity withholding too.
Afterwards, I compare the monopolist and social planner cases to provide a
more accurate measure for the extent of market power of the monopolist. To
achieve this goal, I calculate the social planner’s mark-up (prior to starting
up its peakload generator) and isolate it from the corresponding monopolist’s
mark-up.
In the social planner’s problem, total discounted expected social surplus is to
be maximized. In that regard, I use the same approach as Dixit and Pindyck
(1994, Chapter 9). First, I deﬁne the area under the demand curve for a
given production level, Q(t), by:
U [X(t), Q(t)] =
∫ Q(t)
0
D[X(t), Q(t)]dq =
∫ Q(t)
0
(X−γq)dq = XQ(t)−γQ(t)
2
2
(16)
Then the total social surplus for a given production level, Q(t), is:
Sω[X(t), Q(t)] = maxQ {U [X(t), Q(t)]− Cω[Q(t)]} (17)
where superscript ω = 0, 1 shows whether both of the generators are online,
and Cω[Q(t)] denotes the total cost of current production. In this setup
instantaneous social surplus at time t, Sω[X(t), Q(t)], will replace the proﬁt
ﬂow of a ﬁrm. Therefore, derivations will follow the same steps as the case
of the monopolist. Below, I give how the total social surplus is aﬀected by
the ﬂexibility of the peakload production.
4.1 Fixed Peakload Production
Similar to the monopoly case, baseload-only production takes place when
demand is low enough and there is no need for peakload generation. For
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baseload-only production, when ω = 0, the total social surplus is:
S0[X(t), KB] = XKB − γK
2
B
2
On the other hand, the peakload generator is started up when demand is
high enough. In that case, when ω = 1, the total social surplus is:
S1[X(t), KB +KP ] = X(KB +KP )− γ(KB +KP )
2 + 2cPKP
2
4.2 Flexible Peakload Production
The approach for ﬁnding the total social surplus will be similar to the
monopoly case. Baseload-only production still yields the same total social
surplus as the ﬁxed peakload production case. However, ﬂexible peakload
production entails the following total social surplus when ω = 1:
S1[X(t), KB+q
∗
P (t)] = supqP (t){X[KB+qP (t)]−
γ(KB + qP (t))
2 + 2cP qP (t)
2
}
s.t. qP (t) ≤ qP (t) ≤ KP .
Again similar to the monopoly case, the optimal production of the social
planner consists of three parts. In that regard, optimal production levels for
ﬂexible peakload production are given by:
q∗P (t) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 if X < XSPL
qP if X
SP > X ≥ XSPL
X(t)− cP
γ
−KB if XSP > X ≥ XSP
KP if X ≥ XSP
(18)
where formal deﬁnitions of the trigger demand shock levels: XSPL , X
SP and
X
SP
are presented in the following section.
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4.3 Real Options Set-up
Using standard real options analysis as before, and given the initial state
of the economy [X0, KB, ω = 0], let W
0[X(t), KB] denote the expected net
present value of the total social surplus when the peakload generator is idle
with optimal future strategies. Similarly, W 1[X(t), KB + q
∗
P (t)] is the ex-
pected net present value of the total social surplus when the peakload gen-
erator is active with optimal future strategies. Using standard real options
techniques, W 0[X(t), KB] will be the solution to the ordinary diﬀerential
equation:
1
2
σ2X(t)2W ωXX + αX(t)W
ω
X − rW ω + S0[X(t), KB] = 0 for ω = 0, 1 (19)
Similarly,W 1[X(t), KB+q
∗
P (t)] will be the solution to the ordinary diﬀerential
equation:
1
2
σ2X(t)2W ωXX + αX(t)W
ω
X − rW ω + S1[X(t), KB + q∗P (t)] = 0 for ω = 0, 1
(20)
4.3.1 Value Function for Fixed Peakload Generation
Depending on the previously given social welfare functions, value functions
for the ﬁxed peakload production case are:
W 0 =
{
G1X
β1 + KB
r−αX −
γK2B
2r
if X < XSPH
N2X
β2 + KB+KP
r−α X − γ(KB+KP )
2+2cPKP
2r
− IP if X ≥ XSPH
and
W 1 =
{
G1X
β1 + KB
r−αX −
γK2B
2r
− EP if X ≤ XSPL
N2X
β2 + KB+KP
r−α X − γ(KB+KP )
2+2cPKP
2r
if X > XSPL
Deﬁnition 4. For the social planner, under ﬁxed peakload production, formal
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deﬁnitions of the trigger levels XSPH and X
SP
L are given by:
XSPH = inf
{
X(t)|ω = 0 ∧W 1[X(t), KB +KP ]− IP ≥ W 0[X(t), KB], ∀t
}
(21)
XSPL = sup
{
X(t)|ω = 1 ∧W 0[X(t), KB]− EP ≥ W 1[X(t), KB +KP ], ∀t
}
(22)
By using value matching and smooth-pasting conditions, there will be four
equations and four unknowns (G1, N2, X
SP
L and X
SP
H ). Given the nature of
the value functions, solutions for the trigger levels XSPL and X
SP
H exist but
they cannot be derived analytically. I provide numerical solutions to this
problem in Section 5.
4.3.2 Value Function for Flexible Peakload Generation
Depending on the previously given social welfare functions, value functions
for the ﬂexible peakload production case are:
W 0 =
{
G1X
β1 + KB
r−αX −
γK2B
2r
if X < XSPH
W 1 − IP if X ≥ XSPH
and
W 1 =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
G1X
β1 + KB
r−αX −
γK2B
2r
− EP if X ≤ XSPL
J1X
β1 + J2X
β2 + KB+qP
r−α X − γ(KB+qP )
2+2cP qP
2r
if XSP ≥ X > XL
M1X
β1 +M2X
β2 + 1
2γ
[
X2
r−2α−σ2 − 2cPr−αX +
c2P
r
]
+ cPKB
r
if X
SP ≥ X > XSP
N2X
β2 + KB+KP
r−α X − γ(KB+KP )
2+2cPKP
2r
if X > X
SP
where XSP = [γ(KB + qP ) + cP ] and X
SP
= [γ(KB +KP ) + cP ].
Deﬁnition 5. For the social planner, under ﬂexible peakload production,
formal deﬁnitions of the trigger levels XSPH , X
SP
L , X
SP and X
SP
are given
by:
XSPH = inf
{
X(t)|ω = 0 ∧W 1[X(t), KB + qP ]− IP ≥ W 0[X(t), KB], ∀t
}
(23)
21
Eﬀects of Power Plant Operational Characteristics on Capacity
Withholding and Estimation of Market Power
XSPL = sup
{
X(t)|ω = 1 ∧W 0[X(t), KB]− EP ≥ W 1[X(t), KB + qP ], ∀t
}
(24)
XSP = sup
{
X(t)|ω = 1 ∧ S1[X(t), KB + q∗P (t)] = S1[X(t), KB + qP ], ∀t
}
(25)
X
SP
= inf
{
X(t)|ω = 1 ∧ S1[X(t), KB + q∗P (t)] = S1[X(t), KB +KP ], ∀t
}
(26)
By using value matching and smooth-pasting conditions, there will be eight
equations and eight unknowns (G1, J1, J2, M1, M2, N2, X
SP
L and X
SP
H ).
Given the nature of the value functions, solutions for the trigger levels XSPL
and XSPH exist but they cannot be derived analytically. I provide numerical
solutions to this problem in Section 5.
5 Numerical Results
In this section, I give numerical results to the theoretical derivations of Sec-
tion 3 and 4. As mentioned previously, solutions to the corresponding sys-
tems of equations can only be derived numerically (see Appendix). In my
benchmark simulation, I take values for the initial model parameters as,
α = 0.01, σ = 0.1, r = 0.05, γ = 0.1, cP = 50, qP = 40, KB = 400 and
KP = 200.
5.1 Fixed Peakload Production
Table 1: Trigger Levels for Fixed Peakload Production
KP IP EP X
M
H X
SP
H X
M
L X
SP
L
XMH −XSPH
XMH
200 0 0 127.296 100.00 127.296 100.00 0.214
200 1000 0 159.626 107.389 140.631 92.869 0.3272
200 1000 1000 161.999 109.181 138.016 90.837 0.326
400 1000 1000 180.318 117.731 159.689 102.276 0.347
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Figure 3: Startup and Shutdown Thresholds for Fixed Peakload Production (For
KP = 200, IP = 1000 and EP = 1000)
5.2 Flexible Peakload Production
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Table 2: Trigger Levels for Flexible Peakload Production
qP IP EP X
M
H X
SP
H X
M
L X
SP
L
XMH −XSPH
XMH
40 0 0 105.982 92.00 105.982 92.00 0.1318
40 1000 0 149.905 104.595 119.401 80.7211 0.302
40 1000 1000 153.395 107.222 114.747 76.9399 0.301
80 1000 1000 153.53 107.383 122.526 81.9803 0.301
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Figure 4: Startup and Shutdown Thresholds for Flexible Peakload Production
(For qP = 40, KP = 200, IP = 1000 and EP = 1000)
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Above tables and simulations show that an increase in the values of minimum
operation level (qP ), peakload capacity (KP ) and start up cost (IP ) leads to
an increase in both start up and shut down trigger levels. Furthermore,
an increase in the shut down cost (EP ) increases the start up trigger but
decreases the shut down trigger levels. These results further show that the
monopolist’s start up and shut down trigger price levels are higher than the
social planner’s. Therefore, compared to the social planner, the monopolist
is expected to start up the peakload generator later and shut it down sooner.
Hence, the monopolist is expected to keep the peakload generator active for
a signiﬁcantly shorter period of time.
5.3 Real Options Premium and Adjusted Learner In-
dex
Analysis and determination of the extent of the market power in the elec-
tricity markets have been an important focus for the researchers. A detailed
comparison of indices and models for detecting market power is given in
Twomey et al. (2005). Vassilopoulos (2003) gives another rundown on these
indices and models. Additionally, Wolfram (1999) derives estimates of price-
cost mark-ups using direct measures of marginal cost and several approaches
that do not rely on cost data, Wolak (2003) gives a measure for unilateral
market power using Lerner Index, Newberry (2008) uses the Residual Sup-
ply Index approach to identify the ability of ﬁrms to raise prices, Wu et
al. (2013) propose a long term market power measurement approach named
Transmission Constrained Network Flow.
There are two main approaches to determine the extent of the market power
of the ﬁrms: ex-ante and ex-post approaches. In this section, I focus on the
ex-post determination of the extent of the market power of the monopolist
using a price-cost mark-up approach. The main challenge behind price-cost
mark-up approaches is considered to be the estimation of the marginal costs.
However as denoted in the Introduction, due to the existence of the real
options phenomena, the extent of the market power cannot be accurately
determined by simply comparing the marginal cost to the market price even if
the marginal cost is accurately estimated. Therefore compared to the existing
literature, I give a more accurate ex-post measurement of market power by
pinpointing the impact of uncertainty and certain operational characteristics
on the start up and shut down decisions.
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As I show in the numerical results below, both the monopolist and social
planner wait for prices to rise above the marginal cost of their peakload
generator prior starting up production. Due to market power, this result is
standard for the case of the monopolist but not for the social planner. In
other words, due to market uncertainty and operational characteristics of
the power plants, even the social planner has to wait for the market price to
be higher than its marginal cost prior to starting up the peakload generator
(contrary to conventional P = MC view). Therefore, we observe a mark-up
for the social planner’s case as if it is exercising market power. I refer to this
unavoidable mark-up for the social planner as the real options premium.
By identifying real options premium in the social planner’s case, we are now
able to explain a part of the monopolist’s mark-up during the periods where
market power is exercised by withholding capacity. Considering Figure 4,
the monopolist withholds capacity and does not start up the peakload gener-
ator when the demand shock level satisﬁes X ∈ [XSPH , XMH ). In this interval,
the social planner produces electricity with the peakload generator whereas
the monopolist does not. Therefore we start to see a market price diﬀer-
ence between the cases of the social planner and the monopolist. Since the
monopolist is to start up peakload generator when X = XMH , I consider the
extent of the monopolist’s ability to withhold capacity by comparing start
up trigger prices of the social planner and the monopolist. Hence, the real
options adjusted mark-up for the monopolist becomes a more accurate mea-
sure than the conventional Lerner Index for the extent of monopolist’s ability
to withhold capacity.
Table 3 and Table 4 give mark-ups for the monopolist and social planner
in the form of Price Cost Mark-up Index (PCMI ). By deﬁnition, PCMI for
the social planner is simply the real options premium. In calculating PCMI, I
take PMH and P
SP
H as the corresponding trigger prices prior to starting up the
peakload generator for the monopolist and the social planner. The trigger
prices and the PCMI ’s are given as:
PMH = D[X
M
H , KB] and P
SP
H = D[X
SP
H , KB] (27)
PCMI i =
P iH − cP
cP
for i = M, SP. (28)
Remark 6. Since I am investigating the extent of market power (e.g., ca-
pacity withholding), I am primarily concerned with the monopolist’s ability
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to increase prices prior to starting up the peakload generator. I do not use
prices after start up because upon start up, there will be a downward jump in
price (due to increased production) which will result in underestimating the
extent of market power of the monopolist.8
In the light of calculation of real options premium, I further compare the
conventional Lerner Index (Li) to the real options-adjusted Lerner Index (Li)
for the monopolist. The aim is to give a better estimation for the market
power. In that regard, for the calculation of Li, I put the social planner’s
start up trigger price instead of the marginal cost of peakload generator in
the conventional formula of the Lerner Index. This way, I acknowledge the
fact that even the social planner have to optimally start production at a
price above the marginal cost. Therefore, deﬁnitions for conventional and
real options-adjusted Lerner Indices for the monopolist are:
LM =
PMH − cP
PMH
and LM =
PMH − P SPH
PMH
. (29)
Sensitivity analysis in the following tables show signiﬁcant levels of real op-
tions premium for both ﬁxed and ﬂexible peakload generation cases. Specif-
ically, the real options premium takes values between 20%-55.4% of the
marginal cost of the peakload generator for ﬁxed peakload generation and be-
tween 4%-34.7% for ﬂexible peakload generation. These levels of real options
premium explain more than 24% of the monopolist’s mark-up. So, ignoring
real options premium results in signiﬁcantly overestimating the market power
of the monopolist. In that regard, real options-adjusted Lerner Index gives
a better estimate of the extent of the monopolist’s market power.
5.3.1 Fixed Peakload Generation Case
The table below shows how the real options premium in the ﬁxed peakload
generation case is aﬀected by the capacity, start up cost and shut down
cost of the peakload generator. An increase in all these three parameters
increases the corresponding start up trigger prices and hence the value of the
8The same approach can also be applied to the regions where the monopolist shuts down
peakload generator but the social planner keeps it operational, i.e. when X ∈ (XSPL , XML ].
In that case, PCMI ’s can be calculated by comparing shut down prices of the monopolist
and the social planner.
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conventional Lerner Index. However, an increase in the start up trigger price
does not necessarily increase the value of the real options-adjusted Lerner
Index. Table 3 shows that for some cases, the increase in the real options
premium might be higher than the increase in the start up trigger price. So,
a higher start up price does not necessarily indicate an increase in the extent
of market power of the monopolist.
Table 3: Real Options Premium for Fixed Peakload Generation
KP IP EP P
M
H P
SP
H PCMI
M PCMISP LM LM
200 0 0 87.296 60.00 0.75 0.20 0.43 0.31
200 1000 0 119.626 67.389 1.40 0.35 0.58 0.43
200 1000 1000 121.999 69.181 1.44 0.38 0.59 0.43
400 1000 1000 140.318 77.731 1.80 0.55 0.64 0.45
5.3.2 Flexible Peakload Generation Case
The table below shows how the real options premium for ﬂexible peakload
generation case is aﬀected by the minimum operation level, start up cost
and shut down cost of the peakload generator. Contrary to the previous
ﬁxed peakload generation case, the capacity does not have an impact on
the real options premium as the peakload generator is to be started at the
mimum operation level. On the other hand, in line with the previous case,
an increase in all these three parameters increases the corresponding start
up trigger prices and the value of the conventional Lerner Index. Table 4
shows that an increase in start up trigger price does not necessarily increase
the value of the real options-adjusted Lerner Index.
Table 4: Real Options Premium for Flexible Peakload Generation
qP IP EP P
M
H P
SP
H PCMI
M PCMISP LM LM
40 0 0 65.982 52.00 0.32 0.04 0.24 0.21
40 1000 0 109.905 64.595 1.20 0.29 0.54 0.41
40 1000 1000 113.395 67.222 1.27 0.34 0.56 0.41
80 1000 1000 113.53 67.383 1.27 0.35 0.56 0.41
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5.4 Impact of Flexible Peakload Production
In this section, I investigate the impact of ﬂexible peakload production on
the start up trigger levels. In Table 5 below, I give the diﬀerence between
start up trigger price levels for ﬁxed and ﬂexible peakload generation cases.
By nature, ﬁrms with ﬁxed peakload production capabilities can only start
up their production at full capacity. Therefore, the asking price to start up
generation is expected to be higher for the ﬁxed peakload production case.
In other words, existence of peakload generators with ﬁxed production could
be expected to result in higher market clearing prices compared to ﬂexible
peakload production case. My aim in this section is to show the extent of
the eﬀect of ﬁxed peakload generation on the start up trigger levels.
In the numerical analysis throughout Section 5, I do not consider the start
up of the peakload generator at marginal quantitites to obtain more realistic
results. Therefore, in Table 5, I investigate the case of a signiﬁcantly high
minimum operation level at 20% of the total peakload capacity. Speciﬁcally,
I keep the base model parameters as before and ﬁx the other key parameters
at KP = 200 and qP = 40.
Table 5: Impact of Flexibility
IP EP
PMH (Fixed)− PMH (Flexible)
PMH (Fixed)
P SPH (Fixed)− P SPH (Flexible)
P SPH (Fixed)
0 0 0.244 0.133
1000 0 0.081 0.041
1000 1000 0.07 0.028
Under these conditions, Table 5 shows that there is a signiﬁcant impact
of ﬂexible peakload production on the start up trigger levels. Speciﬁcally,
ﬂexible peakload production helps to reduce the start up trigger levels. As
mentioned previously, this result is rather intuitive as the monopolist (or the
social planner) starts up production at higher quantities for the ﬁxed peak-
load generation case. Furthermore, impact of ﬂexible peakload production
reduces with the start up and shut down costs. As a result, the diﬀerence
between start up trigger levels go down from 24.4% to 7% for the monopoly
case and from 13.3% to 2.8% for the social planner case.
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6 Conclusion
This paper studies the eﬀects of operational characteristics of power plants
on optimal dispatch decisions and estimation of market power. Speciﬁcally,
I provide a real options model to show how operational characteristics of
power plants and market uncertainty aﬀect the extent of economic capacity
withholding. Furthermore, I derive start up and shut down trigger levels of
the peakload generator for both monopoly and social planner cases. These
trigger levels are obtained numerically due to the nature of the real options
model. Numerical ﬁndings throughout this paper can be summarized as:
– An increase in the values of minimum operation level (qP ), peakload
capacity (KP ) and start up cost (IP ) leads to an increase in both start
up and shut down trigger levels. Furthermore, an increase in the shut
down cost (EP ) increases the start up trigger but decreases the shut
down trigger levels.
– Due to higher start up and shut down trigger levels, the monopolist
is expected to keep the peakload generator active for a signiﬁcantly
shorter period of time compared to the social planner.
– The social planner optimally waits for higher prices (than its marginal
cost) prior to starting up the peakload generator. Comparing start up
trigger prices for the social planner to marginal cost, reveals signiﬁcant
levels of real options premium. Under the existence of start up and
shut down costs, the real options premium takes values of more than
30% of the marginal cost of the peakload generator.
– For both ﬁxed and ﬂexible peakload generation cases, the real options
premium explains about 24% to 30% of the monopolist’s mark-up.
– The real options-adjusted Lerner Index shows that an increase in start
up trigger prices does not necessarily mean an increase in the extent
of market power of the monopolist since the increase in real options
premium may exceed the increase in start up trigger prices.
– Flexible peakload generation, compared to ﬁxed peakload generation,
helps to lower real options premium levels for the social planner and the
extent of market power for the monopolist by lowering optimal start
up trigger levels.
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Overall, the existence of signiﬁcant real options premium levels shows that
ignoring market uncertainties and operational characteristics of individual
generators, results in overestimating the extent of market power of the ﬁrms
in the industry. Therefore, real options analysis can be an asset for more
accurate investigations and decisions on the exercise of market power (e.g.,
economic capacity withholding). This result leads to a reinterpretation of
the Lerner Index that takes the real options premium into account.
A Appendix Additional Model Details and
Results
A.1 Monopolist production
A.1.1 System of Equations for Fixed Peakload Generation
A1X
β1
H +
KB
r − αXH−
γK2B
r
= F2X
β2
H +
KB +KP
r − α XH−
γ(KB +KP )
2 + cPKP
r
−IP
(30)
β1A1X
β1−1
H +
KB
r − α = β2F2X
β2−1
H +
KB +KP
r − α (31)
A1X
β1
L +
KB
r − αXL−
γK2B
r
−EP = F2Xβ2L +
KB +KP
r − α XL−
γ(KB +KP )
2 + cPKP
r
(32)
β1A1X
β1−1
L +
KB
r − α = β2F2X
β2−1
L +
KB +KP
r − α (33)
Using above equations, in order to numerically solve for A1, F2, XH and XL,
I derive the equations below:
(β2 − β1)A1Xβ1H = β2
[
β2 − 1
β2
KP
r − αXH −
γ(2KBKP +K
2
P ) + cPKP
r
− IP
]
(34)
(β1 − β2)F2Xβ2H = β1
[
β1 − 1
β1
KP
r − αXH −
γ(2KBKP +K
2
P ) + cPKP
r
− IP
]
(35)
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(β2 − β1)A1Xβ1L = β2
[
β2 − 1
β2
KP
r − αXL −
γ(2KBKP +K
2
P ) + cPKP
r
+ EP
]
(36)
(β1 − β2)F2Xβ2L = β1
[
β1 − 1
β1
KP
r − αXL −
γ(2KBKP +K
2
P ) + cPKP
r
+ EP
]
(37)
A.1.2 System of Equations for Flexible Peakload Generation
A1X
β1
H +
KB
r − αXH −
γK2B
r
= C1X
β1
H + C2X
β2
H +
KB + qP
r − α XH
−γ(KB + qP )
2 + cP qP
r
− IP
(38)
β1A1X
β1−1
H +
KB
r − α = β1C1X
β1−1
H + β2C2X
β2−1
H +
KB + qP
r − α (39)
A1X
β1
L +
KB
r − αXL −
γK2B
r
− EP = C1Xβ1L + C2Xβ2L +
KB + qP
r − α XL
−γ(KB + qP )
2 + cP qP
r
(40)
β1A1X
β1−1
L +
KB
r − α = β1C1X
β1−1
L + β2C2X
β2−1
L +
KB + qP
r − α (41)
C1X
β1 + C2X
β2 +
KB + qP
r − α X −
γ(KB + qP )
2 + cP qP
r
= (42)
D1X
β1 + D2X
β2 +
1
4γ
[
X2
r − 2α− σ2 −
2cP
r − αX +
c2P
r
]
+
cPKB
r
β1C1X
β1−1 + β2C2Xβ2−1 +
KB + qP
r − α = β1D1X
β1−1 + β2D2Xβ2−1
+
1
4γ
[
2X
r − 2α− σ2 −
2cP
r − α
] (43)
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D1X
β1
+ D2X
β2
+
1
4γ
[
X
2
r − 2α− σ2 −
2cP
r − αX +
c2P
r
]
+
cPKB
r
=
F2X
β2
+
KB +KP
r − α X −
γ(KB +KP )
2 + cPKP
r
(44)
β1D1X
β1−1
+β2D2X
β2−1
+
1
4γ
[
2X
r − 2α− σ2 −
2cP
r − α
]
= β2F2X
β2−1
+
KB +KP
r − α
(45)
where β1 > 1, β2 < 0, X = [2γ(KB+KP )+ cP ] and X = [2γ(KB+ qP )+ cP ].
Furthermore, β1, β2 are solutions for the following quadratic equation:
1
2
σ2β2 +
(
α− 1
2
σ2
)
β − r = 0. (46)
Given the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions, analytical solu-
tions for C1, C2 −D2, D1 and D2 − F2 exist. However, analytical solutions
for A1, C2, XH and XL do not exist. Hence, I conduct numerical analysis by
using the equations (38) - (41). I provide the numerical solutions in Section
5.
A.2 Social planner’s production
A.2.1 System of Equations for Fixed Peakload Generation
G1X
β1
H +
KB
r − αXH−
γK2B
2r
= N2X
β2
H +
KB +KP
r − α XH−
γ(KB +KP )
2 + 2cPKP
2r
−IP
(47)
β1G1X
β1−1
H +
KB
r − α = β2N2X
β2−1
H +
KB +KP
r − α (48)
G1X
β1
L +
KB
r − αXL−
γK2B
2r
−EP = N2Xβ2L +
KB +KP
r − α XL−
γ(KB +KP )
2 + 2cPKP
2r
(49)
β1G1X
β1−1
L +
KB
r − α = β2N2X
β2−1
L +
KB +KP
r − α (50)
Using above equations, in order to numerically solve for A1, F2, XH and XL,
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I derive the equations below:
(β2 − β1)G1Xβ1H = β2
[
β2 − 1
β2
KP
r − αXH −
γ(2KBKP +K
2
P ) + 2cPKP
2r
− IP
]
(51)
(β1 − β2)N2Xβ2H = β1
[
β1 − 1
β1
KP
r − αXH −
γ(2KBKP +K
2
P ) + 2cPKP
2r
− IP
]
(52)
(β2 − β1)G1Xβ1L = β2
[
β2 − 1
β2
KP
r − αXL −
γ(2KBKP +K
2
P ) + 2cPKP
2r
+ EP
]
(53)
(β1 − β2)N2Xβ2L = β1
[
β1 − 1
β1
KP
r − αXL −
γ(2KBKP +K
2
P ) + 2cPKP
2r
+ EP
]
(54)
A.2.2 System of Equations for Flexible Peakload Generation
G1X
β1
H +
KB
r − αXH −
γK2B
2r
= J1X
β1
H + C2X
β2
H +
KB + qP
r − α XH
−γ(KB + qP )
2 + 2cP qP
2r
− IP
(55)
β1G1X
β1−1
H +
KB
r − α = β1J1X
β1−1
H + β2C2X
β2−1
H +
KB + qP
r − α (56)
G1X
β1
L +
KB
r − αXL −
γK2B
2r
− EP = J1Xβ1L + J2Xβ2L +
KB + qP
r − α XL
−γ(KB + qP )
2 + 2cP qP
2r
(57)
β1G1X
β1−1
L +
KB
r − α = β1J1X
β1−1
L + β2J2X
β2−1
L +
KB + qP
r − α (58)
J1X
β1 + J2X
β2 +
KB + qP
r − α X −
γ(KB + qP )
2 + 2cP qP
2r
=
M1X
β1 + M2X
β2 +
1
2γ
[
X2
r − 2α− σ2 −
2cP
r − αX +
c2P
r
]
+
cPKB
r
(59)
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β1J1X
β1−1 + β2J2Xβ2−1 +
KB + qP
r − α = β1M1X
β1−1 + β2M2Xβ2−1
+
1
2γ
[
2X
r − 2α− σ2 −
2cP
r − α
] (60)
M1X
β1
+ M2X
β2
+
1
2γ
[
X
2
r − 2α− σ2 −
2cP
r − αX +
c2P
r
]
+
cPKB
r
=
N2X
β2
+
KB +KP
r − α X −
γ(KB +KP )
2 + 2cPKP
2r
(61)
β1M1X
β1−1
+β2M2X
β2−1
+
1
2γ
[
2X
r − 2α− σ2 −
2cP
r − α
]
= β2N2X
β2−1
+
KB +KP
r − α
(62)
where β1 > 1, β2 < 0, X = [γ(KB +KP ) + cP ] and X = [γ(KB + qP ) + cP ].
Furthermore, β1, β2 are solutions for the following quadratic equation:
1
2
σ2β2 +
(
α− 1
2
σ2
)
β − r = 0. (63)
Given the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions, analytical solu-
tions for J1, J2 −M2, M1 and M2 −N2 exist. However, analytical solutions
for G1, J2, XH and XL do not exist. Hence, I conduct numerical analysis by
using the equations (55) - (58). I provide the numerical solutions in Section
5.
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Abstract
Electricity production from wind power generators holds signiﬁcant impor-
tance in European Union’s 20% renewable energy target by 2020. In this
paper, using a Cournot oligopoly model, I investigate the short term eﬀects
of wind generator ownership by owners of fossil-fueled peakload generators.
I show that aggregate wind generator ownership reduces the positive impact
of the wind generation on the market outcomes and as a result the total
peakload production decreases and the market price increases. Furthermore,
when all wind generators are owned by the peakload ﬁrms, the impact of wind
generation on the market outcomes vanishes. Additionally, start up and shut
down (suspension) price thresholds are signiﬁcantly higher when the owner
of peakload capacity also owns a share of wind power generators. I also ﬁnd
that a feed-in premium support scheme does not aﬀect the peakload ﬁrms
production levels and hence the market outcomes. However, under a feed-in
tariﬀ type of support scheme, there is an increase in the total production
and a decrease in the market price.
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1 Introduction and Literature Review
Electricity production from wind power generators holds signiﬁcant impor-
tance in European Union’s 20% renewable energy target by 2020. On the
upside, wind power is considered to be a low-cost, environmentally friendly
and non-strategic way to produce electricity. On the downside, wind power
production is stochastic and it may require high levels of operating reserves
to maintain a certain level of security of supply.
In this paper, using a Cournot oligopoly model, I investigate the short term
eﬀects of wind generator ownership by owners of fossil-fueled peakload gen-
erators. I show that aggregate wind generator ownership reduces the positive
impact of the wind generation on the market outcomes and as a result the
total peakload production decreases and the market price increases. Fur-
thermore, when all wind generators are owned by the peakload ﬁrms, the
impact of wind generation on the market outcomes vanishes. Additionally,
start up and shut down (suspension) price thresholds are signiﬁcantly higher
when the owner of peakload capacity also owns a share of wind power gener-
ators. I also ﬁnd that a feed-in premium support scheme does not aﬀect the
peakload ﬁrms production levels and hence the market outcomes. However,
under a feed-in tariﬀ type of support scheme, there is an increase in the total
production and a decrease in the market price.
A number of papers focus on the short and long term impacts of high levels of
wind/renewable power penetration in liberalized electricity markets. Sensfuß
et al. (2008) analyze the impact of renewable electricity generation on the
electricity market in Germany. Lamont (2008) investigates the system-wide
eﬀects of large-scale intermittent technologies in an electric generation sys-
tem. Green and Vasilakos (2009) evaluate the impact of intermittent wind
generation on hourly equilibrium prices and output. Bushnell (2010) mod-
els the impact of large amount of wind generation on the generation mix.
Twomey and Neuhoﬀ (2010) investigate how the relationship between wind
production and market price is aﬀected by market power. Ketterer (2012)
investigates the price volatility eﬀects of intermittent wind power genera-
tion in Germany. Ambec and Crampes (2012) analyze the basic param-
eters that should be considered to determine the capacity of intermittent
and non-intermittent production plants anticipating their eﬃcient dispatch.
Bouckaert and De Borger (2013) study strategic capacity choices between
conventional dispatchable and intermittent generation technologies.
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In the relevant literature (Sensfuß et al. (2008), Green and Vasilakos (2009),
Twomey and Neuhoﬀ (2010)), wind production is simply regarded as a nega-
tive shock to demand and it lowers the need for electricity from conventional,
fossil-fueled generators. However, this perspective greatly ignores the eﬀects
of ownership of wind generators. Those eﬀects are important because owner-
ship of the wind generators creates additional rents for the ﬁrms that exercise
market power with their conventional generators. Therefore we may expect
ﬁrms, that have wind generators in their generation portfolio, to produce less
electricity with their conventional generators than those who do not own any
wind generators at all. As a result, we may further expect diﬀerent mar-
ket outcomes for diﬀerent ownership structures given the same level of wind
production.
This paper can be regarded as an extension of Twomey and Neuhoﬀ (2010).
For the Cournot model, I keep their basic model structure and extend their
ﬁndings by introducing diﬀerent market competition scenarios based on the
ownership of wind generators. They focus on the competition at the con-
ventional generator level and disregard the possibility of the ownership of
wind generators by the existing conventional generator owners. On the other
hand, I calculate the equilibrium production levels and market prices to see
the eﬀects of diﬀerent ownership scenarios of the wind generators.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2, I set up a Cournot
oligopoly model and provide an analysis on the equilibrium production levels
to investigate the eﬀects of wind generator ownership on the market out-
comes as well as start up and shut down decisions. In section 3, I give a
discussion on the impact of the internalization of wind generation from a
welfare point of view. In section 4, I investigate the eﬀects of two main types
of renewable support schemes on the market outcomes. In section 5, I give a
brief conclusion on my ﬁndings.
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2 The Model
In the short term, there are two ways to exercise market power for (peakload)
ﬁrms in the electricity markets. First, ﬁrms can decrease the level of output
by withholding capacity (Joskow and Kahn, 2002). Second, they expectedly
operate their generators for a signiﬁcantly shorter period of time by asking
higher start up and shut down prices than the corresponding socially opti-
mal case (Misir, 2014). Furthermore Green and Vasilakos (2009) note that
a strategic generator that owns wind farms would wish to take their wind
output into account when calculating the supply function from its thermal
plants. In this section, following the argument of Green and Vasilakos (2009)
and adopting the basic model set up of Twomey and Neuhoﬀ (2010), I pro-
vide a Cournot oligopoly model that incorporates diﬀerent wind generator
ownership scenarios under oligopolistic peakload competition. I aim to show
how optimal capacity withholding and dispatch decisions of the peakload
ﬁrms are aﬀected by wind generator ownership.
In this section, I assume that the industry consists of two types of electricity
generation technologies: wind (W ) and conventional peakload (P ) genera-
tion. I do not put restrictions on the number of generators available for each
technology as I assume that peakload generators could be instantly started
up and shut down without any costs. I further assume that wind generation
is subject to exogenous shocks and zero marginal cost of production, whereas
peakload generation has constant marginal cost of production c > 0.
At time t, the industry output is determined by the sum of wind and peak-
load production: Q(t) = QW (t) + QP (t). Instantaneous stochastic wind
production is given by:
QW (t) = QW,0 + t ≥ 0 (1)
where QW,0 is the average wind production level, t is the exogenous shock to
the wind production with the support [−QW,0,∞) and properties E[t] = 0
and V ar[t] = σ
2.
There are no side payments and regardless of the technology, all production
is paid the market clearing price. The market price ﬂuctuates stochastically
according to linear inverse demand function, D : R+ → R:
P (t) = D[QP (t) +QW (t)] = X − γQ(t) with γ > 0. (2)
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where X > c is the constant demand intercept.
Below, I describe two diﬀerent market scenarios. First, I investigate the
benchmark case where there is a social planner or perfect competition in the
industry. Second, I investigate the case where there is oligopolistic Cournot
competition at the peakload level. For the oligopolistic competition, I give
the results of wind generator ownership on total production and market price.
I further provide results on welfare implications as well as start up and shut
down decisions of peakload generators.
2.1 Social Planning and Competitive Equilibrium
I set the benchmark by calculating the optimal production and market price
in the case of the social planner. The social planner’s objective is to maxi-
mize total social surplus by deciding how much to produce by conventional
peakload generators given the level of wind production. In order to maximize
total social surplus, S[QSP (t)], the social planner will have to calculate the
area under the demand curve for a given production level and subtract total
cost of production, C[QSP (t)]. As QSP (t) = QP (t) +QW (t), we have:
S[QSP
∗
(t)] = supQP
{[∫ QSP (t)
0
(X − γq)dq
]
− C[QSP (t)]
}
= supQP
{
X(QP +QW (t))− γ(QP +QW (t))
2
2
− cQP
}
(3)
The ﬁrst order condition entails:
QP (t) =
X − c
γ
−QW (t) =⇒ QSP (t) = X − c
γ
=⇒ P SP (t) = c. (4)
It follows from (4) that the social planner fully internalizes the eﬀects of wind
generation and as a result, the total socially optimal level of production does
not depend on total wind production. But if total wind production is higher
than the total socially optimal level of production (i.e., QW (t) > (X− c)/γ),
there will be no production coming from the peakload generators and the
market price will be even lower than the marginal cost of peakload generation.
On the other hand, for the case of perfect competition at the peakload level,
one should start with the very last step in (4). Since, perfectly competitive
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ﬁrms are price takers and equate price to marginal cost to ﬁnd out how much
to produce, the market outcome for the cases of social planner and perfect
competition will be the same.
Remark 1. Ownership structures of the wind generators do not have an
impact on the aggregate peakload production and market price for the case of
perfect competition at the peakload level. Perfectly competitive peakload ﬁrms
observe the total wind production and decide how much to produce at the
peakload level in order to reach the equilibrium production and price levels
given in (4). In other words, perfectly competitive peakload ﬁrms produce
enough to set the market price to marginal cost. Therefore, we end up with
the same market outcome regardless of the structure of the wind generator
ownership.
2.2 Oligopolistic Cournot Competition
In this section, I investigate the market outcomes under the existence of
oligopoly at the peakload level. I derive a general formula for the equilibrium
peakload generation levels depending on the ownership of wind generators.
I aim to show how wind generator ownership aﬀects the individual ﬁrms’
production levels and the industry outcomes. The results in this section show
that all the peakload ﬁrms are inﬂuenced by the aggregate wind generator
ownership regardless of their individual ownership status.
There are n symmetric ﬁrms at the peakload level with the same constant
marginal cost of peakload production, c > 0. I assume that k ≤ n ﬁrms
equally own a share of wind generators and the rest of the ﬁrms at the
peakload level do not own any wind generators at all. By assuming uniform
production throughout wind generators, I consider that ownership of an equal
share of wind generators results in an equal share of wind power production
for each ﬁrm. Without loss of generality, for any ﬁrm j ∈ J = {k + 1, k +
2, ...., n} who does not own any wind generators, the total production is
just the individual peakload production, QP,j(t). Consequently, for any ﬁrm
i ∈ I = {1, 2, ...., k} who owns an equal share of wind generators, the total
individual production is the sum of peakload production and the share of
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total wind production.1 Namely;
Qi(t) = QP,i(t) +AQW (t) (5)
A ∈ Q is a rational number denoting the share of total wind generators
owned by each of the k peakload ﬁrms. This share is formally deﬁned by:
A :=
α
k
(6)
where α ∈ [0, 1] is the share of wind generators aggregately owned by the
peakload ﬁrms. Speciﬁcally, α = 0 when the peakload ﬁrms do not own any
of the wind generators and α = 1 when the peakload ﬁrms own all of the
wind generators.
Given this model, there are two types of proﬁt functions depending on a ﬁrm’s
wind generator ownership status. For any ﬁrm i ∈ I, with wind generator
ownership, the proﬁt function is:
Πi(t) = [X − γ(QP,i+QP,i′ +QP,n−k +QW (t))](QP,i+AQW (t))− cQP,i (7)
where QP,i′ is the aggregate peakload production of the ﬁrms with wind
generator ownership except for ﬁrm i and QP,n−k is the aggregate peakload
production of the ﬁrms without wind generator ownership.
Similarly for any ﬁrm j ∈ J , without wind generator ownership, the proﬁt
function is:
Πj(t) = [X − γ(QP,j +QP,j′ +QP,k +QW (t))]QP,j − cQP,j (8)
where QP,j′ is the aggregate peakload production of the ﬁrms without wind
generator ownership except for ﬁrm j and QP,k is the aggregate peakload
production of the ﬁrms with wind generator ownership.
Given the above proﬁt functions, ﬁrst order conditions entail (see Appendix
A.1) the following equilibrium peakload production levels for ﬁrms i and j :
Q∗P,j(t) =
X − c
γ(n+ 1)
− 1− α
n+ 1
QW (t) (9)
1Although it turns out that my model setup is very close to another recent paper
Ben-Moshe and Rubin (2014), my model allows for asymmetric ownership of the wind
generators. Therefore, it potentially provides more generalized and realistic results.
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Q∗P,i(t) =
X − c
γ(n+ 1)
− 1− α
n+ 1
QW (t)−AQW (t) = Q∗P,j(t)−AQW (t) (10)
Looking at (9), we see two diﬀerent terms. The ﬁrst term is the symmetric
equilibrium level of individual production if the industry did not have any
wind generators at all. The second term is the negative eﬀect of unowned/un-
internalized wind generation on the peakload production. The eﬀect is as if
there is a non-strategic ﬁrm that just produces (1 − α)QW (t) amount of
electricity.
On the other hand, looking at (10), there is an additional term (AQW (t)) in
ﬁrm i ’s equilibrium peakload production. This term is the level of internal-
ized wind generation for the peakload ﬁrms with wind generator ownership.
The internalization results in a decrease in the level of individual peakload
production exactly by the amount of the individual share of wind generation.
Therefore, total (wind plus peakload) production for each peakload ﬁrm is
the same but wind generator ownership results in higher proﬁts as total cost
of production goes down due to zero-cost wind generation.
Proposition 2. For any peakload ﬁrm with wind generator ownership, peak-
load production decreases with the level of wind production and aggregate wind
generator ownership, whereas it increases with the total number of peakload
ﬁrms with wind generator ownership when there is positive wind generation
in the market.
i.e., for any ﬁrm i ∈ I, we have ∂QP,i/∂t < 0, ∂QP,i/∂α < 0 and ∂QP,i/∂k >
0 for QW (t) > 0.
Proof. From (10) we have;
∂QP,i
∂t
= −1− α
n+ 1
− α
k
< 0 (11)
∂QP,i
∂α
=
(
1
n+ 1
− 1
k
)
(QW,0 + t) < 0 (12)
∂QP,i
∂k
=
α
k2
(QW,0 + t) > 0 (13)
Proposition 3. For any peakload ﬁrm with no wind generator ownership,
peakload production decreases with the level of wind production and increases
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with the aggregate wind generator ownership, whereas it does not change with
the total number of peakload ﬁrms with wind generator ownership when there
is positive wind generation in the market.
i.e., for any ﬁrm j ∈ J , we have ∂QP,j/∂t < 0, ∂QP,j/∂α > 0 and
∂QP,j/∂k = 0 for QW (t) > 0.
Proof. From (9) we have;
∂QP,j
∂t
= −1− α
n+ 1
< 0 (14)
∂QP,j
∂α
=
1
n+ 1
(QW,0 + t) > 0 (15)
∂QP,j
∂k
= 0 (16)
Proposition 2 and Proposition 3 show that wind generation decreases
the individual peakload production levels for all peakload ﬁrms. However,
for positive values of α, this eﬀect is dampened and all peakload ﬁrms in-
crease their total production levels. In other words, even if a peakload ﬁrm
does not own any wind generators, it still beneﬁts from the aggregate wind
generator ownership knowing that its competitors are decreasing their peak-
load productions. Speciﬁcally, if a peakload ﬁrm owns a share of the wind
generators, it decreases its peakload production exactly by the amount of its
share of wind generation. As a result, the overall eﬀect of aggregate wind
generator ownership on the peakload production is negative for the ﬁrms with
wind generator ownership since they provide a fraction of their production
from zero-cost wind generation.
Lemma 4. If the number of symmetric ﬁrms that collectively own α share
of wind generators changes, the total peakload production stays the same.
Proof. In order to prove the lemma, it is suﬃcient to show that the total
peakload production for the symmetric equilibrium does not depend on the
parameter k.
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So, taking the previously derived expressions for QP,i and QP,j into account,
the total peakload production is:
QP (t) = kQP,i(t) + (n− k)QP,j(t) = n
n+ 1
X − c
γ
− n+ α
n+ 1
QW (t) (17)
which does not depend on k.
Proposition 5. Following (17), total production and market price are given
by:
Q(t) =
n
n+ 1
X − c
γ
+
1− α
n+ 1
QW (t) and P (t) =
X + nc
n+ 1
− γ(1− α)
n+ 1
QW (t)
(18)
The market price (total production) decreases (increases) with the level of
wind production and increases (decreases) with the aggregate wind generator
ownership when there is positive wind generation in the market. In other
words, aggregate wind generation ownership reduces the positive impact of
the wind generation on the market outcomes and as a result it increases the
market power of the peakload ﬁrms.
Proof. It follows from (18) that:
∂P
∂t
= −γ(1− α)
n+ 1
< 0 (19)
∂Q
∂t
=
1− α
n+ 1
> 0 (20)
∂P
∂α
=
γ
n+ 1
(QW,0 + t) > 0 (21)
∂Q
∂α
= −QW,0 + t
n+ 1
< 0 (22)
It follows from (9) and (10) that when α = 1, total peakload production
decreases exactly by the amount of the total wind production and as a result,
total industry production and the market price do not depend on the level
of wind production. This is simply because, when all of the wind generators
are owned by the peakload ﬁrms, the eﬀects of wind generation are entirely
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internalized by the peakload ﬁrms. Furthermore, as 0 < α < 1, ∂P/∂α > 0.
In other words, if the aggregate ownership of the wind generators by the
peakload ﬁrms increases, so does the market price.
Following (18), Figure 1 depicts the eﬀect of aggregate wind generator
ownership on the residual demand curve that peakload ﬁrms face. As I
pointed out in Section 1, if we disregard wind generator ownership of the
peakload ﬁrms, wind generation is expected to decrease the demand exactly
by its current level. But as I showed in (10), peakload ﬁrms internalize
their share of wind production in equilibrium. Hence, the residual demand
that the peakload ﬁrms face will be subject to the level of aggregate wind
generator ownership.
0
Pr
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(P
)
Quantity (Q)
0<alpha<1 alpha=1alpha=0
Demand  (DT)
Residual Demand
       (alpha=0)
Residual Demand
     (0<alpha<1)
DT− (1−alpha)QW
Figure 1: Eﬀect of aggregate wind generator ownership (α) on the residual de-
mand curve.
Looking at Figure 1, we see that when α = 0, none of the wind generators
are owned by the peakload ﬁrms and the demand curve shifts to the left
exactly by the amount of the current level of wind generation. On the other
hand, when 0 < α < 1, the residual demand curve shifts closer back to
the original demand due to internalization of the wind production. In other
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words, total demand does only decrease by the level of uninternalized wind
generation ((1−α)QW (t)). Moreover, when α = 1, the eﬀect of uninternalized
wind generation vanishes and as a result, the residual demand and original
demand curves coincide.
In summary, wind generator ownership provides a higher level of market
power to the peakload ﬁrms and as a result, the total production and the mar-
ket price increases with aggregate wind power ownership (α). Additionally,
it can be seen from (18) that, as the number of peakload ﬁrms approaches
inﬁnity, the increase in market power resulting from owning wind genera-
tors becomes inﬁnitesimal. Hence, the eﬀects of aggregate wind generator
ownership vanishes.
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2.3 Start up and Shut down Decisions
In Section 2.2, I calculated the equilibrium peakload production levels
depending on the status of wind generator ownership. Given the model
structure, the peakload ﬁrms ﬁrst observe the level of wind generation. Af-
terwards, when the level of wind generation is high enough, the peakload
generators are shut down and when the wind generation is low enough, the
peakload generators are started up.2 Since it is not possible to have negative
peakload generation, equilibrium peakload production levels given in (9) and
(10) must be non-negative. As there are no start up or shut down costs in
the model, there will be a single wind generation threshold for both start
up and shut down decisions of a speciﬁc ﬁrm to satisfy the non-negativity
constraint of peakload production.3
In this section, I provide a basic analysis on the start up and shut down
decisions of the peakload generators by calculating the (start up/shut down
wind generation) threshold for the ﬁrms with wind generator ownership, Qi,
and the threshold for the ﬁrms without wind generator ownership, Qj.
Looking at the corresponding equilibrium peakload production levels in (9)
and (10), the thresholds are diﬀerent for the ﬁrms with and without wind
generator ownership. When α = 0, all peakload ﬁrms have the same thresh-
old. As 0 < α < 1, by equating the corresponding equilibrium peakload
production level to zero for any ﬁrm i that owns A share of total wind gen-
erators, the threshold is given by:
Qi =
1
1− α +A(n+ 1)
X − c
γ
(23)
For any ﬁrm j that does not own any wind generators, the threshold is given
by:
Qj =
1
1− α
X − c
γ
(24)
We see that A(n+ 1) > 0 since α > 0. Then, it follows from (23) and (24)
2In this context, start up means positive peakload generation whereas shut down means
zero peakload generation.
3If there exists start up and/or shut down costs for the peakload generators, the start
up thresholds would be higher than the shut down thresholds for the peakload ﬁrms (see
Misir (2014)).
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that Qi < Qj. In other words, peakload ﬁrms that own wind generators will
decide not to produce with their peakload generators for lower realizations
of total wind generation, QW (t). In other words, wind generator ownership
results in peakload generators to start up or shut down production at a
lower wind generation level. If we think in terms of prices, due to downward
sloping demand curve, corresponding price thresholds become higher for the
peakload ﬁrms with wind generator ownership. As a result, wind generator
ownership increases the price thresholds as it increases the market power of
the peakload ﬁrms. We further see that ∂Qi/∂α < 0 and ∂Qj/∂α > 0. In
other words, as the aggregate ownership of wind generators (α) increases,
there are opposite impacts on the thresholds. Hence, the diﬀerence between
thresholds for ﬁrm i and j increases.
In summary, increased market power of a peakload ﬁrm due to wind generator
ownership, allows it to start up its peakload generator later and shut it down
earlier compared to the ﬁrms with no wind generator ownership. This result
happens because the increased market price will positively aﬀect the proﬁts
coming from the wind generators for the ﬁrms with wind generator ownership.
It is clear that the model in this paper neither adopts a continuous-time
(Misir (2014)) nor a discrete-time (see Dixit and Pindyck (1994)) setup that
could help us to fully investigate the impact of wind generation ownership
on the start up and shut down decisions. In such models, it can be expected
to see the diﬀerence between start up and shut down thresholds to get even
bigger with the introduction of an intertemporal model allowing start up and
shut down costs.
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3 Welfare Implications
As it was mentioned before, when wind generation is high enough, there
will not be any need for peakload generation. Therefore, peakload ﬁrms will
not have any strategic actions to take when facing suﬃciently large wind
generation levels. As a result, aggregate wind generator ownership does not
have an impact on consumer and producer surplus when peakload generators
are idle. In this section, the derivations apply to the situation in which wind
generation is so low that all the ﬁrms in the industry ﬁnd it proﬁtable to
produce electricity with their peakload generators.
For that situation, I provide the eﬀects of wind generator ownership on pro-
ducer surplus, consumer surplus and total social surplus for the models given
in the previous section. I speciﬁcally focus on the relationship between ag-
gregate wind generator ownership and the volatility of wind generation. The
derivations below show that aggregate wind generator ownership does not
have an impact for the case of social planner. However, derivations show
that aggregate wind generator ownership reduces the eﬀects of volatility of
the wind generation for the oligopoly case because of the internalization of
wind generation.
3.1 Social Planner
As stated in Remark 1, ownership structures of the wind generators do
not have an eﬀect on the socially optimal level of production. Using the
conventional deﬁnitions (see 3.2), expressions for consumer surplus as well
as producer surplus and total social surplus for the case of social planner (or
perfect competition) are:
CSSP =
(X − c)2
2γ
, PSSP = c(QW,0 + t) , S
SP =
(X − c)2
2γ
+ c(QW,0 + t)
(25)
Therefore, expected values are given by
E[CSSP ] =
(X − c)2
2γ
, E[PSSP ] = cQW,0 , E[S
SP ] =
(X − c)2
2γ
+ cQW,0
(26)
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Due to internalization of the entire wind generation; E[CSSP ], E[PSSP ] and
E[SSP ] do not depend on the volatility, σ2. Furthermore, ∂CSSP/∂t = 0,
∂PSSP/∂t > 0 and ∂S
SP/∂t > 0. In other words, producer surplus and
total social surplus increase with wind production whereas consumer surplus
does not change. This result is obtained since producer surplus is simply
the cost savings due to internalized wind generation. Therefore, producer
surplus and hence total social surplus are positively aﬀected by the level of
wind generation.
3.2 Cournot Oligopoly
In this section, I investigate the eﬀects of wind generator ownership on the
(expected) consumer surplus, producer surplus and total social surplus for
the oligopoly case. By using the conventional deﬁnitions, I derive expected
consumer surplus (E[CSα]) as well as producer surplus (E[PSα]) and total
social surplus (E[Sα]) for α share of aggregate wind generator ownership.
I use the conventional deﬁnition for consumer surplus as the diﬀerence in
area under the demand curve for a given production level, Q(t), minus the
total market value of purchasing that level of output. Therefore, for our
linear inverse demand function, we have:
CS[Q(t)] =
[∫ Q(t)
0
(X − γq)dq
]
− (X − γQ(t))Q(t) = γQ(t)
2
2
(27)
Given the total production level in (18), we have:
CSα[QW (t)] =
n2
(n+ 1)2
(X − c)2
2γ
+
n(1− α)(X − c)
(n+ 1)2
QW (t)+
γ(1− α)2
2(n+ 1)2
QW (t)
2
(28)
Producer surplus for a given prodution level (Q(t)) is given by the total
revenue minus the total cost of production. Hence:
PS[Q(t)] = (X − γQ(t))Q(t)− cQP (t) (29)
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Again taking (18) into account, we have:
PSα[QW (t)] =
n
(n+ 1)2
(X − c)2
γ
+
[
(1− n)(1− α)(X − c)
(n+ 1)2
+ c
]
QW (t)
−γ(1− α)
2
(n+ 1)2
QW (t)
2
(30)
For the calculation of the social surplus we can either use the objective func-
tion in (3) or alternatively the sum of the consumer and producer surplus.
Then total social surplus is given by:
Sα[QW (t)] =
n(n+ 2)
(n+ 1)2
(X − c)2
2γ
+
[
(1− α)(X − c)
(n+ 1)2
+ c
]
QW (t)−γ(1− α)
2
2(n+ 1)2
QW (t)
2
(31)
Given the above derivations of PSα, CSα and Sα expected values are:
E[CSα] =
n2
(n+ 1)2
(X − c)2
2γ
+
n(1− α)(X − c)
(n+ 1)2
QW,0+
γ(1− α)2
2(n+ 1)2
(Q2W,0+σ
2)
(32)
E[PSα] =
n
(n+ 1)2
(X − c)2
γ
+
[
(1− n)(1− α)(X − c)
(n+ 1)2
+ c
]
QW,0
−γ(1− α)
2
(n+ 1)2
(Q2W,0 + σ
2)
(33)
E[Sα] =
n(n+ 2)
(n+ 1)2
(X − c)2
2γ
+
[
(1− α)(X − c)
(n+ 1)2
+ c
]
QW,0−γ(1− α)
2
2(n+ 1)2
(Q2W,0+σ
2)
(34)
There are two straightforward results of (32) - (34). First, it follows from
Lemma 4 that the total peakload production and hence the total social
surplus is independent of k. Second, the volatility of wind generation (σ2)
has no impact on the expected social surplus when all of the wind generators
are owned by the peakload ﬁrms (i.e., α = 1). This is again because, in both
of those cases, the eﬀects of wind generation are fully internalized by the
peakload ﬁrms.
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Proposition 6. The expected consumer surplus increases whereas the ex-
pected producer surplus and the expected social surplus decrease with the
volatility of wind generation.
Proof. It follows from (30) - (32) that:
∂E[CSα]
∂σ2
=
γ(1− α)2
2(n+ 1)2
> 0
∂E[PSα]
∂σ2
= −γ(1− α)
2
(n+ 1)2
< 0
∂E[Sα]
∂σ2
= −γ(1− α)
2
2(n+ 1)2
< 0
Proposition 6 shows that the negative eﬀect of volatility on the producer
surplus outweighs the positive eﬀect on the consumer surplus. Therefore the
volatility of wind generation (σ2) negatively aﬀects the expected social sur-
plus. This negative eﬀect is lower in the wind generator ownership case as
the internalization of the wind generator dampens the eﬀect of σ2. Further-
more, the eﬀect of the volatility on the expected consumer, producer and
total social surplus decreases with α.
55
Wind Generators and Market Power: Does it matter who owns them?
4 Cournot Equilibrium Under Diﬀerent Re-
newable Energy Support Schemes
Renewable energy support schemes are instruments to facilitate the deploy-
ment, production and use of energy from renewable sources. Although there
are a number of renewable energy support schemes, in general, they will result
in diﬀerent returns for the same level of wind generation compared to the no-
support case. In other words, under the existence of these support schemes,
ﬁrms with renewable energy generators will face diﬀerent proﬁt functions
than (7). Therefore, we might see changes to the corresponding ﬁrst order
conditions and hence to the equilibrium outcomes and even the investment
decisions. In that regard, Held et al. (2014) document and compare diﬀerent
types of renewable support schemes from a theory and real-life applications
points of view. Boomsma et al. (2012) further investigate how investment
decisions in renewable energy change under diﬀerent support schemes. They
speciﬁcally look into how feed-in tariﬀs and renewable energy certiﬁcate trad-
ing impact investment timing and capacity.
The main assumption in this paper so far has been that the wind energy
production is awarded at the market clearing price. This assumption can be
relaxed based on the speciﬁc renewable support schemes that are adopted in
speciﬁc markets. Hence, in this section, I study how the Cournot equilibrium
and market outcomes change under diﬀerent renewable support schemes.
Speciﬁcally, I investigate the eﬀects of two main types of renewable support
schemes on the equilibrium outcomes. In summary, a ﬁxed feed-in premium
support scheme does not aﬀect the peakload ﬁrms production levels and
hence market outcomes. However, a feed-in tariﬀ ﬁxes the per unit revenues
for wind generation and as a result, the peakload ﬁrms with wind generators
act as if they do not own any wind generation at all. Therefore, there is an
increase in the total production and a decrease in the market price under a
feed-in tariﬀ type of support scheme.
4.1 Equilibrium under ﬁxed feed-in premium
Feed-in premium refers to a payment to the owners of wind generators on
top the market clearing price. As a result, ﬁrms are encouraged to invest in
wind generators by gaining extra rents to make up for costs and uncertain-
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ties wind generator ownership might bring them. Applying a ﬁxed feed-in
premium scheme in the model results in a change in the proﬁt functions for
the ﬁrms with wind generator ownership. Hence, there will be changes to
the corresponding ﬁrst order conditions.
For any ﬁrm i ∈ I, with wind generator ownership, the proﬁt function is:
Πi(t) = [X−γ(QP,i+QP,i′+QP,n−k+QW (t))](QP,i+AQW (t))+F1AQW (t)−cQP,i
(35)
where QP,i′ is the aggregate peakload production of the ﬁrms with wind
generator ownership except for ﬁrm i, QP,n−k is the aggregate peakload pro-
duction of the ﬁrms without wind generator ownership and F1 is the ﬁxed
feed-in premium ﬁrm i gets per wind power production.
Following the same steps in Appendix A.1 the ﬁrst order condition for ﬁrm
i entails:
QP,i =
1
k + 1
[
X − c
γ
−QP,n−k − (A+ 1)QW
]
(36)
which is the same expression as the no-support case given in the Appendix
A.1. Since, the best-response function for any ﬁrm j without wind gener-
ator ownership would not change either, the resulting equilibrium peakload
production levels are going to be the same as (9) and (10). Therefore, a
ﬁxed feed-in premium has no impact on the market outcomes and the only
change would be an increase in the producer surplus. 4
4.2 Equilibrium under feed-in tariﬀ
Feed-in tariﬀ refers to the payment of a predetermined ﬁxed price to the
owners of wind generation instead of the market clearing price for certain
number of years. Policy makers determine and announce these ﬁxed tariﬀs
for renewable electricity generation and update it periodically. The main
beneﬁt of this approach is to get rid of the price uncertainty that the investors
in wind generators face.
4A ﬂoating feed-in premium might return diﬀerent results here as there will be changes
to F1 in the proﬁt function. Speciﬁcally, if the feed-in premium depends on the production,
there will be a diﬀerent result then (36) for the peakload ﬁrms with generator ownership.
As a result, the equilibrium production and price levels would diﬀer. (See Held et al.
(2014) for a more detailed discussion on ﬂoating feed-in premiums.)
57
Wind Generators and Market Power: Does it matter who owns them?
For any ﬁrm i ∈ I, with wind generator ownership, the proﬁt function is:
Πi(t) = [X−γ(QP,i+QP,i′ +QP,n−k+QW (t))]QP,i+F2AQW (t)−cQP,i (37)
where QP,i′ is the aggregate peakload production of the ﬁrms with wind
generator ownership except for ﬁrm i, QP,n−k is the aggregate peakload pro-
duction of the ﬁrms without wind generator ownership and F2 is the feed-in
tariﬀ ﬁrm i gets per wind power production.
Then the ﬁrst order condition for ﬁrm i entails:
QP,i =
1
k + 1
[
X − c
γ
−QP,n−k −QW
]
(38)
It is evident that (38) does not depend onA. Since the ﬁrm j ’s best-response
function would stay the same as before, we have a symmetric equilibrium for
peakload production:
QP,i = QP,j =
X − c
γ(n+ 1)
− QW
n+ 1
(39)
Given these peakload production levels, we have the following equilibrium
market production and price:
Q(t) =
n
n+ 1
X − c
γ
+
QW (t)
n+ 1
and P (t) =
X − c
n+ 1
− γQW (t)
n+ 1
(40)
We see from (39) that the peakload ﬁrms do not internalize their share of
wind generation anymore and simply act as if they do not own any wind
generation at all. As a result, peakload and total production is higher and
market price is lower compared to the no-support case. In other words, a feed-
in tariﬀ support scheme eliminates the eﬀects of wind generation ownership
on the market outcomes. In the end, although peakload production levels
stays the same for all ﬁrms, total production and the proﬁts for the ﬁrms
with wind generators increase.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, I investigate the short term eﬀects of wind generator ownership
by the owners of fossil-fueled peakload generators. I use a Cournot oligopoly
model to show the eﬀects on the individual and total peakload production
levels as well as the market price. I also provide a basic analysis of the
start up and shut down decisions of the peakload generators. Furthermore,
I investigate the welfare impacts of wind generation ownership and explore
the eﬀects of diﬀerent renewable support schemes on the market outcomes.
The oligopoly model in this paper shows that, wind generator ownership by
owners of peakload generators results in signiﬁcantly lower total peakload
production and higher market prices. Moreover, every peakload ﬁrm is in-
ﬂuenced by the aggregate wind generator ownership. In that regard, while
the ﬁrms without wind generators increase their peakload production, the
ﬁrms with wind generators decrease theirs. Furthermore, by internalizing
their share of wind generation, peakload ﬁrms decrease their total produc-
tion costs and earn higher proﬁts. In addition, when all wind generators are
owned by the peakload ﬁrms, the impact of wind generation on the market
outcomes vanishes. I further ﬁnd that the peakload ﬁrms that own wind
generators ask higher start up and shut down prices under higher levels of
wind generator ownership. I additionally show that eﬀect of the volatility
of the wind generation on the expected consumer, producer and total so-
cial surpluses decreases with the aggregate wind generation ownership due
to internalization of the wind generation.
Given the theoretical evidence in this paper, I conclude that wind genera-
tor ownership potentially increases the market power of the peakload ﬁrms.
However this result depends on what type of renewable support schemes are
adopted in speciﬁc markets. In any case, policy makers and regulators need
to take into account the outcomes of the possible ownership structures in the
electricity markets as important as the investment in renewable electricity
production technologies.
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A Appendix Additional Model Details and
Results
A.1 Oligopolistic Cournot Equilibrium
Proﬁt function for any ﬁrm i ∈ I is given:
Πi(t) = [X − γ(QP,i +QP,i′ +QP,n−k +QW (t))](QP,i +AQW (t))− cQP,i
Therefore, ﬁrm i ’s objective is to maximize the proﬁt function:
maxQP,i{Πi(t)} (41)
s.t. QP,i ≥ 0.
Then, the ﬁrst order condition is given by:
QP,i =
1
2
[
X − c
γ
−QP,i′ −QP,n−k − (A+ 1)QW
]
By taking QP,i′ = (k − 1)QP,i, best-response function for ﬁrm i is given by:
QP,i =
1
k + 1
[
X − c
γ
−QP,n−k − (A+ 1)QW
]
Similarly for any ﬁrm j ∈ J , we have:
Πj(t) = [X − γ(QP,j +QP,j′ +QP,k +QW (t))]QP,j − cQP,j
Hence, ﬁrm j ’s objective is to maximize the proﬁt function:
maxQP,j{Πj(t)} (42)
s.t. QP,j ≥ 0.
Then the ﬁrst order condition entails:
QP,j =
1
2
[
X − c
γ
−QP,j′ −QP,k −QW
]
By taking QP,j′ = (n− k − 1)QP,j, best-response function for ﬁrm j is given
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by:
QP,j =
1
n− k + 1
[
X − c
γ
−QP,k −QW
]
By inserting QP,j into QP,i, we get the equilibrium quantities:
Q∗P,j(t) =
X − c
γ(n+ 1)
− 1− α
n+ 1
QW (t)
Q∗P,i(t) =
X − c
γ(n+ 1)
− 1− α
n+ 1
QW (t)−AQW (t)
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Abstract
In this paper, we compare the investment timing and investment capacity for
the optimal level of investment for a strategic ﬁrm and a social planner that
have a one-time opportunity to invest in two types of electricity generators.
In our paper we do not only focus on the diﬀerences in costs for diﬀerent
technologies but also on the diﬀerences in operation of those technologies
and how those diﬀerences impact the optimal investment decisions. In our
model, the one-time investment decision requires the determination of de-
mand shock trigger level, choice of technology and level of optimal capacity.
We speciﬁcally investigate how the investment triggers, optimal capacities
and technology choices change with the changes to the investment cost func-
tion, demand uncertainty and the level of installed capacity in the market.
In the numerical results, we ﬁnd that the strategic ﬁrm tends to invest at
a higher demand trigger level and lower capacity compared to the social
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planner for both the baseload and peakload investment cases. Hence, the
strategic ﬁrm is expected to invest at a later date while incurring lower
investment costs. Furthermore, for both the strategic ﬁrm and the social
planner, ﬁxed baseload generation is preferable during low uncertainty cases
whereas high uncertainty tends to result in the choice of ﬂexible peakload
generation. We additionally ﬁnd that highly convex investment costs greatly
diminishes the impact of market power on the investment decisions. We also
ﬁnd that with increased levels of installed capacity and installed capacity
ownership, the strategic ﬁrm delays the new investment and increases the new
investment capacity. However increased share of production in the market
for the strategic ﬁrm does not necessarily increase its expected proﬁts.
Keywords: Real options, investment, electricity.
JEL Classiﬁcation: D92, L11, L13, L94
1 Introduction
Investment decisions in electricity markets have been a long lasting focus of
researchers. In this paper, we exclusively focus on the investment decisions
of diﬀerent types of electricity generators. Using real options analysis and
following Hagspiel et al. (2010) and Huisman and Kort (2012), we compare
the investment timing and optimal level of investment for a strategic ﬁrm
and a social planner in a simpliﬁed electricity market. In that regard, we
combine investment in electricity generation and real options.
There exists vast real options literature on a ﬁrm’s optimal investment and
capacity decisions. In the seminal works of this area, Pindyck (1988) stud-
ies investment decisions by examining the value and cost of incremental in-
vestment and Dixit (1992) focuses on the irreversible investment in scale
economies. Additionally, Dangl (1999) and Hagspiel et al. (2010) investigate
a ﬁrms investment timing and capacity choice based on the uncertainty of
demand shift parameter. Huisman and Kort (2012) further provide a dy-
namic analysis of entry deterrence/accommodation strategies in a duopoly
setting.
In the real options literature we also ﬁnd studies focusing on investment
decisions in electricity markets. Aguerrevere (2005), presents a model of
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investment under uncertainty that includes time to build, capacity choice
and ﬂexibility in the use of the installed capacity, and considers the eﬀect
of competition. Liski and Murto (2009) consider a model of capital replace-
ment under uncertainty of energy costs. Boomsma et al. (2012) investigate
how investment decisions in renewable energy change under diﬀerent support
schemes. Abadie and Chamorro (2012) address the valuation of an operating
wind farm and the ﬁnite-lived option to invest in such a farm under diﬀerent
reward and/or support schemes.
The options literature provides additional studies that investigates the tech-
nology choice in the electricity markets. Nasakkala and Fleten (2004) com-
pute optimal building and upgrading thresholds for gas ﬁred power plant in-
vestments; Madlener and Wickart (2007) explain the decision making prob-
lem when the decision is between making an irreversible investment in a
combined heat-and-power production (cogeneration) system, or to invest in
a conventional heat-only generation system (steam boiler); Bobtcheﬀ (2008)
studies the investment decision problem of a duopoly with price competition
on a market of ﬁnite size driven by stochastic shocks on proﬁt; Takashima et
al. (2010) investigate how an investor makes decisions about timing, sizing,
and technology choice.
The main contribution of this paper is to extend the real options literature to
allow for the ownership of a generation portfolio of diﬀerent technologies after
an irreversible investment in electricity generation takes place. Contrary to
the vast majority of the papers in the literature, the diﬀerence in technology
choice is not just about the cost of investment or operation. Diﬀerent tech-
nology choices entail diﬀerent revenue streams and hence a diﬀerent approach
to evaluate the investment decisions. In our paper we do not only focus on
the diﬀerences in costs for diﬀerent technologies but also on the diﬀerences in
operation of those technologies and how those diﬀerences impact the optimal
investment decisions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we give the
aim and formal set up. Additionally, we provide model derivations for the
strategic ﬁrm and the social planer cases. In Section 3, we give numerical
results to the theoretical derivations of Section 2. In Section 4, we provide a
brief conclusion on our ﬁndings.
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2 Model Setup
Our model is an extension of the models studied by Hagspiel et al. (2010)
and Huisman and Kort (2012). We speciﬁcally extend their models to study
investment in electricity markets. Compared to their models, our model al-
lows for not only linear but also convex and concave investment costs for
the electricity generation investment of a strategic ﬁrm and hypothetical so-
cial planner. Additionally, the strategic ﬁrm in question is allowed to own
some level of installed capacity of baseload technology prior to the invest-
ment decision. We compare the investment decisions of the strategic ﬁrm
and hypothetical social planner and explore the eﬀects of market power on
the investment decisions of diﬀerent types of generator investments. We fur-
ther investigate how the choice of technology changes with respect to certain
model parameters.
The starting point of our model is a simpliﬁed electricity market that has
K ≥ 0 level of installed capacity already in place. To simplify the model, we
assume that all installed capacity is of a single technology. This capacity is
always active, producing electricity at full capacity and subject to a constant
marginal cost of production c > 0. Furthermore, the strategic ﬁrm in the
industry owns a fraction of the generation from the installed capacity, A ∈
[0, 1], and has a one-time opportunity to invest in electricity generation.
The sole source of uncertainty in our model is the exogenous demand shock
following a Geometric Brownian Motion:
dX(t) = αX(t)dt+ σX(t)dz (1)
where α is the drift paramater, σ is the volatility parameter, dt is the incre-
ment of time and dz is the increment of a Wiener process.1 2
We assume that there are two types of technologies to choose from: baseload
and peakload. To simplify our derivations and determination of the technol-
ogy choice, we assume that the decision between these two mutually exclusive
1Using this speciﬁc stochastic process is a standard assumption in the real options
literature. By assuming this dynamic, we can derive closed-form solutions for the options
values.
2If price or proﬁt uncertainties are used in this context, investment in new generation
would have no impact on the existing assets. Therefore demand uncertainty assumption is
crucial to assess the relationship between existing assets and new generation investment.
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projects is to be made at time zero by the investor. The marginal cost of
production for the new generator depends on the choice of technology and
satisﬁes cB < c < cP , where cB is the marginal cost for the baseload tech-
nology and cP is the marginal cost for the peakload technology. Therefore,
investing in baseload generation entails lower marginal cost of production
than the installed capacity. Whereas investing in peakload capacity entails
higher marginal cost of production than the installed capacity.
If the baseload type of generator is chosen, the marginal cost of production
for the new generator will be low but the generator will always operate at full
capacity and never shuts down. However, if the peakload generator is chosen,
the marginal cost of production will be high but electricity generation could
be costlessly suspended when the demand is low. The investor can then
invest in Knew > 0 level of new capacity and investing in this capacity is
subject to ﬁxed cost I and variable cost Kλnew. Therefore, total investment
cost equals to I+Kλnew where λ ≥ 0. This investment cost function is convex
when λ > 1, linear when λ = 1 and concave when λ < 1.
We further assume that the market price of electricity ﬂuctuates stochasti-
cally according to a linear inverse demand function, D : R+ × R+ → R:
P (t) = D[X(t), Q(t)] = X(t)− γQ(t) with γ > 0, (2)
where Q(t) is the total industry production at time t and X(t) is the stochas-
tically varying demand intercept. 3
In the following sections we explore the investment decisions of the strate-
gic ﬁrm and the social planner when there are two types of technology to
choose from: an always-on ﬁxed production technology and another technol-
ogy that can be costlessly suspended. In the relevant literature, the main
distinction between these two types of technologies is that peakload genera-
tors to have lower investment costs and higher marginal costs compared to
baseload generators (see Joskow (2006)). However, this distinction is not
enough to capture the value of ﬂexible production of a peakload generator.
Speciﬁcally, disregarding the values of option to suspend and option to start
up operation will result in undervaluing the peakload generators. This point
will be addressed in more detail in the following sections.
3Note that we do not impose any restrictions on inverse demand function. Therefore,
depending on the model parameters and the investment decisions, market prices could get
negative.
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2.1 Strategic Firm
In this section, we explore the investment decisions of the strategic ﬁrm. Our
aim in this section is to show how the derivations diﬀer with the technology
choice.
2.1.1 Baseload Investment
In this section, we consider the investment decision of the strategic ﬁrm when
the technology in question is the always-on baseload technology. The strate-
gic ﬁrm’s decision is to maximize the total discounted value of its investment
by choosing a level of demand shock level, XSF , as the investment trigger and
choosing a level of capacity to invest, KSF , at the time when the stochastic
demand shock hits the corresponding trigger level. The strategic ﬁrm starts
utilizing its new generator upon its investment and is assumed not to face
any entry threats. Therefore, the strategic ﬁrm in this model does not have
to concern itself with preemption or entry deterrence strategies. Let V de-
note the value of the ﬁrm. Then the strategic ﬁrm faces an optimal stopping
problem which can be formally given as:
V (X) = supτSF≥0,KSF≥0E
[∫ τSF
0
e−rtΠ0SF (t)dt+
∫ ∞
τSF
e−rtΠ1SF (t)dt
−e−rτSF (I +KλSF ) | X(0) = X
] (3)
as we assume that X(0) < XSF and deﬁne:
τSF = inf {t ≥ 0|X(t) ≥ XSF} , (4)
where r is the exogenously speciﬁed riskless rate of return and τSF is the time
of investment. Furthermore, Π0SF (t) is the instantaneous proﬁt function of
the strategic ﬁrm until the time of investment and Π1SF (t) is the instantaneous
proﬁt function of the strategic ﬁrm afterwards. Therefore the ﬁrst term in
the objective function is the discounted value of the proﬁts from the installed
capacity prior to investment, the second term is the discounted value of the
proﬁts from both the installed capacity and the new baseload generation,
and the last term is the discounted cost of investment.
Assuming that the strategic ﬁrm invests in KSF level of baseload capacity,
total electricity production of the strategic ﬁrm before the investment, t <
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τSF , is simply the production from the installed capacity, AK. Whereas
the total electricity production of the strategic ﬁrm after the investment,
t ≥ τSF , is the sum of the production from the share of installed capacity
and the production from the new baseload capacity, AK +KSF . Hence the
total production of the strategic ﬁrm is:
QSF (t) =
{
AK if t < τSF
AK +KSF if t ≥ τSF (5)
Note that after the investment takes place, the total electricity production
will always be equal to AK+KSF even if the momentary demand shock falls
below the trigger level (i.e., X < XSF ).
Consequently, the instantaneous proﬁt function of the strategic ﬁrm before
the investment (i.e., t < τSF ) is simply the proﬁts from the installed capacity:
Π0SF (t) = (X(t)− γK)AK − cAK (6)
and the proﬁt function after the investment (i.e., t ≥ τSF ) is the sum of the
proﬁts from the installed capacity and the new baseload capacity:
Π1SF (t) = (X(t)− γ(K +KSF ))(AK +KSF )− cBKSF − cAK (7)
= Π0SF (t) +X(t)KSF − (γ(A+ 1)K + γKSF + cB)KSF (8)
Note that after the investment of new baseload capacity there are additional
proﬁts whenever X(t) > γ(A+ 1)K + γKSF + cB.
2.1.2 Value Function and Additional Model Derivations
Now that we know the proﬁt function of the strategic ﬁrm, the next step
is to determine the value function before and after the investment. At the
time of investment, following Huisman and Kort (2012), the value function
is given by:
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−rtΠ1SF (t)dt− (I +KλSF ) | X(0) = X
]
(9)
On the other hand, before the investment, the value function equals the sum
of the option value to invest and the discounted value of the proﬁts coming
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from the installed capacity. By using dynamic programming, the option value
of the investment FM(X,KSF ) satisﬁes:
FM(X,KSF ) = e
−rdtE
[
F SF (X(t), KSF ) + dF
SF (X(t), KSF ) | X(0) = X
]
(10)
Using standard real options techniques (i.e., using Ito’s Lemma to expand
the right hand side and then neglecting the terms that go to zero), the option
value to invest will be the solution to the ordinary diﬀerential equation (see,
Dixit and Pindyck (1994), Chp. 4):
1
2
σ2X2
d2F SF
dX2
+ αX
dF SF
dX
− rF SF = 0 (11)
Hence, excluding the bubble solution (i.e., the term that goes to inﬁnity),
the option value for the strategic ﬁrm who is to invest in KSF level of new
capacity is of the form:
B(KSF )X
β for X < XSF (12)
where β > 1 is the positive root of the quadratic equation:
1
2
σ2β2 +
(
α− 1
2
σ2
)
β − r = 0. (13)
Furthermore, the discounted value of the proﬁts coming from the installed
capacity before the investment is given by:
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−rtΠ0SF (t)dt
]
(14)
Hence, combining (12) and (14), gives the value function before the invest-
ment as:
B(KSF )X
β + E
[∫ ∞
0
e−rtΠ0SF (t)dt
]
(15)
We assume that there exists an optimal demand shock trigger level X∗SF and
optimal investment capacity K∗SF such that the supremum in (3) is realized.
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Then by combining (7), (9) and (15) we get the value function4:
V (X) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
BXβ +
AK
r − αX −
(γK + c)AK
r
if X < X∗SF
AK +K∗SF
r − α X −
(γK + c)AK
r
− (I +K∗SF λ) if X = X∗SF
−(γ(A+ 1)K + γK
∗
SF + cB)K
∗
SF
r
(16)
It can be seen from the above function that, when X(t) < X∗SF , it is more
proﬁtable to wait and hence the strategic ﬁrm only receives the proﬁts com-
ing from its conventional generators. On the other hand, the ﬁrst time
X(t) = X∗SF holds, the strategic ﬁrm incurs the total investment cost I+K
λ
SF
and starts receiving the additional proﬁts coming from the new baseload gen-
erator.
Proposition 1. The optimal investment threshold X∗SF and the optimal in-
vestment capacity K∗SF satisfy
5:
X∗SF
r − α −
(γ(A+ 1)K + 2γK∗SF + cB)
r
− λK∗SF λ−1 = 0 (17)
β − 1
β
K∗SF
r − αX
∗
SF −
(γ(A+ 1)K + γK∗SF + cB)K
∗
SF
r
− I −K∗SF λ = 0 (18)
Proof of Proposition 1 is given in Appendix A.1.
4If the technology choice is to be made at a later date than t = 0, the value function
before the investment would include the option value to invest in both types of technologies.
In other words, both options would be alive until one of the mutually exclusive technologies
is chosen (see Takashima et. al. (2010)).
5These equations are only suﬃcient conditions and the equations may have multiple
solutions that does not necessarily give the same expected value. But the propositions in
this paper make it possible to determine a ﬁnite number of candidates, where the optimal
solution returns the highest expected value for the total assets. See Appendix for details.
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2.1.3 Peakload Investment
In this section, we consider the investment decision of the strategic ﬁrm when
the technology in question is the costlessly suspendible peakload technology.
Since we are dealing with a diﬀerent type of generator than before, the strate-
gic ﬁrm is to receive a diﬀerent proﬁt ﬂow for the peakload technology case.
Therefore the objective and the value functions in this case diﬀerent than
the previous section.
We do not have a straightforward value function for the peakload invest-
ment case as the peakload generation can be costlessly suspended. Therefore
to simplify our derivations, we divide the value function in two: the value
function before the investment and the value function after the investment.
Since the value function before the investment requires the determination of
the value of an active generator, we start the derivation by ﬁnding the value
function after the investment. So, we ﬁrst look at the production levels after
the investment takes place. Since the generation can be suspended, the total
production of the strategic ﬁrm after the investment is:
QM(t) =
{
AK if X < XSF
AK +KSF if X ≥ XSF (19)
where XSF is the demand shock level at which the peakload operation is
costlessly started up or shut down and deﬁned by:
XSF =
{
X(t)|Π0SF [X(t), AK] = Π1SF [X(t), AK +KSF ], ∀t
}
(20)
= γ(A+ 1)K + γKSF + cP (21)
Since the peakload generator can be suspended costlessly, the strategic ﬁrm
suspends the operation when the demand is so low that the proﬁts when
the peakload generator is active is lower than the proﬁts when the peakload
generator is idle. Furthermore, in the case of ownership of a generation
portfolio, A > 0, the strategic ﬁrm starts up and suspends operation at a
single threshold where the market price signiﬁcantly exceeds the marginal
cost of peakload generation. This strategy is used to oﬀset the negative
impact of the new investment on the market price.
Given (19), the proﬁt function of the strategic ﬁrm before the investment or
when the generation is suspended is simply the instantaneous proﬁts from
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the installed capacity:
Π0SF (t) = (X(t)− γK)AK − cAK (22)
and the proﬁt function when the peakload generator is active is the sum of
the proﬁts from the installed capacity and the peakload capacity:
Π1SF (t) = (X(t)− γ(K +KSF ))(AK +KSF )− cPKSF − cAK (23)
= Π0SF (t) +X(t)KSF − (γ(A+ 1)K + γKSF + cP )KSF (24)
Given the above proﬁt functions the value function after the investment is
given by:
V˜ (X) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
CXβ1 +
AK
r − αX −
(γK + c)AK
r
if X ≤ XSF
DXβ2 +
AK +K∗SF
r − α X −
(γK + c)AK
r
if X > XSF
−(γ(A+ 1)K + γK
∗
SF + cP )K
∗
SF
r
(25)
where DXβ2 is the option value to suspend operation and CXβ1 is the option
value to start up operation. Furthermore, β1 > 1 and β2 < 0 are the roots
of the quadratic equation:
1
2
σ2β2 +
(
α− 1
2
σ2
)
β − r = 0. (26)
Note that (25) is only the value function after the investment. In order to
ﬁnd the option value to invest and ultimately derive the optimal investment
strategy, we need to derive the value function before the investment and
combine it with (25).
The derivation of the value before the investment follows the same steps as
(25). Therefore it is simply of the same form as the value function when the
peakload generation is suspended, i.e. X ≤ XSF . The only diﬀerence is the
constant found in the option value to invest due to existence of investment
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cost. Speciﬁcally we have the value function before the investment:
V (X) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
LXβ1 +
AK
r − αX −
(γK + c)AK
r
if X < X∗SF
DXβ2 +
AK +K∗SF
r − α X −
(γK + c)AK
r
− (I +K∗SF λ) if X = X∗SF
−(γ(A+ 1)K + γK
∗
SF + cP )K
∗
SF
r
(27)
here X∗SF is the optimal demand shock trigger level whereK
∗
SF level of invest-
ment in new peakload capacity takes place, I+K∗SF is the cost of investment,
DXβ2 is the option value to suspend operation and LXβ1 is the option value
to invest.
Remark 2. Note that at the time of investment, the strategic ﬁrm have two
states of production to choose from. It can either have a suspended or ac-
tive peakload generator upon the investment. However, choosing to have a
suspended generator does not return any additional proﬁts whereas it requires
early incurrence of the investment cost. Therefore by waiting longer to invest
and choosing to produce electricity with the new generator upon the invest-
ment, the strategic ﬁrm can earn additional proﬁts. Furthermore since the
investment would take place at a later date, the discounted cost of investment
of the new geerator would be lower for the strategic ﬁrm. Hence, we always
have X∗SF ≥ XSF .
Proposition 3. The optimal investment threshold X∗SF and the optimal in-
vestment capacity K∗SF satisfy:
D′(K∗SF )X
∗
SF
β2 +
X∗SF
r − α −
(γ(A+ 1)K + 2γK∗SF + cP )
r
−λK∗SF λ−1 = 0 (28)
β1 − β2
β1
D(K∗SF )X
∗
SF
β2 +
β1 − 1
β1
K∗SF
r − αX
∗
SF −
(γ(A+ 1)K + γK∗SF + cP )K
∗
SF
r
−I −K∗SF λ = 0
(29)
Proof of Proposition 2 is given in Appendix A.2.
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Remark 4. Apart from the marginal costs, the diﬀerence between Proposi-
tion 1 and Proposition 2 is the additional terms in Proposition 2 that
uses the option value to suspend peakload generation, DXβ2. This distinction
shows that when comparing the value or investment decisions of the genera-
tors with ﬁxed and ﬂexible generation, focusing simply on the diﬀerences on
marginal and investment costs is not suﬃcient. Disregarding the values of
option to suspend and option to start up operation will result in undervaluing
the peakload generators.
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2.2 Social Planner
In this section, we investigate the social planner’s problem. The aim is to see,
with the same set up as before, how the social planner’s optimal actions diﬀer
from the strategic ﬁrm’s. For the social planner’s problem, total discounted
expected social surplus is to be maximized. In other words, the social planner
maximizes the sum of producer surplus and consumer surplus. In that regard,
we use the same approach as Dixit and Pindyck (1994, Chapter 9). First, we
deﬁne the area under the demand curve for a given production level, Q(t),
by:
U [Q(t)] =
∫ Q(t)
0
D[q]dq =
∫ Q(t)
0
(X − γq)dq = XQ(t)− γQ(t)
2
2
(30)
Then total social surplus for a given production level, Q(t), is:
S[Q(t)] = U [Q(t)]− C[Q(t)] (31)
where C[Q(t)] denotes the total cost of current production. In this setup,
instantaneous social surplus at time t, S[Q(t)], will replace the proﬁt ﬂow of
a ﬁrm. Therefore, derivations will follow the same steps as the case of the
strategic ﬁrm.
2.2.1 Baseload Investment
Let W denote the value of the social planner, then the optimal stopping
problem of the social planner is:
W (X) = supτSP≥0,KSP≥0E
[∫ τSP
0
e−rtS0(t)dt+
∫ ∞
τSP
e−rtS1(t)dt
−e−rτSP (I +KλSP ) | X(0) = X
] (32)
as we assume that X(0) < XSP and deﬁne:
τSP = inf {t ≥ 0|X(t) ≥ XSP} , (33)
where τSP is the time of investment and XSP is the trigger capacity fac-
tor level when KSP level of generator investment takes place. Furthermore,
S0(t) is the instantaneous social surplus until the investment and S1(t) is
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the instantaneous social surplus afterwards. Therefore the ﬁrst term in the
objective function is the discounted value of the social surplus from the in-
stalled capacity prior to investment, the second term is the discounted value
of the social surplus from both the installed capacity and the new generation,
and the last term is the discounted cost of investment.
Assuming that the social planner invests in KSP level of new baseload ca-
pacity, the total production before and after the investment are:
QSP (t) =
{
K if t < τSP
K +KSP if t ≥ τSP (34)
Note that as the social planner aims to maximize the total social surplus
based on the total production and not just the producer surplus, the value
A does not have an impact on the social planner’s production levels.
Consequently, the total social surplus before the investment, t < τSP , is:
S0(t) = XK − cK − γ
2
K2 (35)
and the total social surplus after the investment, t ≥ τSP , is:
S1(t) = X(K +KSP )− cK − cBKSP − γ
2
(K +KSP )
2 (36)
= S0(t) +XKSP − cBKSP − γKKSP − γ
2
KSP
2 (37)
2.2.2 Value Function and Additional Model Derivations
In this section, we follow the same steps as the case of the strategic ﬁrm. We
start with the value function at the time of investment which is given by:
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−rtS1(t)dt− (I +KλSP ) | X(0) = X
]
(38)
Before the investment, the value function equals the sum of the option value
to invest and the discounted value of the social surplus coming from the
installed capacity. Therefore, following the same steps as the case of the
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strategic ﬁrm gives the value function before the investment as:
G(KSP )X
β + E
[∫ ∞
0
e−rtS0(t)dt
]
(39)
Again, by following the same steps in the previous section, the value function
for the social planner who invests in KSP is given by:
W (X) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
GXβ +
K
r − αX −
γK2 + 2cK
2r
if X < XSP
∗
K +K∗SP
r − α X −
γ(K +K∗SP )
2 + 2cK + 2cBK
∗
SP
2r
if X = XSP
∗
−(I +K∗SP λ)
(40)
where, β > 1 is the positive root of the following quadratic equation:
1
2
σ2β2 +
(
α− 1
2
σ2
)
β − r = 0. (41)
It can be seen from the above value function that, when X < X∗SP , it is not
optimal to invest yet and hence the social planner only receives the proﬁts
coming from its conventional generators. On the other hand, the ﬁrst time
X = X∗SP holds, the social planner incurs the total investment cost I+KSP
λ
and starts beneﬁting from the additional social surplus coming from the new
investment.
Proposition 5. The investment threshold X∗SP and the optimal investment
capacity K∗SP satisfy:
X∗SP
r − α −
γK + γK∗SP + cB
r
− λK∗SP λ−1 = 0 (42)
β − 1
β
K∗SPX
∗
SP
r − α −
(2γK + γK∗SP + 2cB)K
∗
SP
2r
− I −K∗SP λ = 0 (43)
Proof of Proposition 3 follows the same steps as Proposition 1 and it is
given in Appendix A.3.
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2.2.3 Peakload Investment
As we have explained in the case of the strategic ﬁrm, the value function for
the social planner changes with the technology choice. Following the same
steps as before, the value function for the case of peakload generation for the
social planner after the investment is:
W˜ (X) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
HXβ1 +
K
r − αX −
γK2 + 2cK
2r
if X ≤ XSP
JXβ2 +
K +K∗SP
r − α X −
(γK∗SP + 2γK + 2cP )K
∗
SP
2r
if X > XSP
−γK
2 + 2cK
2r
(44)
whereXSP is the demand shock level that the peakload operation is costlessly
started up or shut down, JXβ2 is the option value to suspend operation and
CXβ1 is the option value to start up operation. Furthermore, β1 > 1 and
β2 < 0 are the roots of the following quadratic equation:
1
2
σ2β2 +
(
α− 1
2
σ2
)
β − r = 0. (45)
where
XSP =
{
X(t)|S0[X(t), K] = S1[X(t), K +KSP ], ∀t
}
(46)
= γK + cP +
γ
2
KSP (47)
Furthermore the value function before the time of new peakload investment
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is given by:
W (X) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
MXβ1 +
K
r − αX −
γK2 + 2cK
2r
if X < X∗SP
JXβ2 +
K +K∗SP
r − α X −
γK2 + 2cK
2r
− (I +K∗SP λ) if X = X∗SP
−(γK
∗
SP + 2γK + 2cP )K
∗
SP
2r
(48)
where X∗SP is the trigger demand shock level that the investment in new
peakload capacity takes place, JXβ2 is the option value to suspend operation
and MXβ1 is the option value to invest.
Proposition 6. The investment threshold X∗SP and the optimal investment
capacity K∗SP satisfy:
J ′(K∗SP )X
∗
SP
β2 +
X∗SP
r − α −
(γK + γK∗SP + cP )
r
− λK∗SP λ−1 = 0 (49)
β1 − β2
β1
J(K∗SP )X
∗
SP
β2 +
β1 − 1
β1
K∗SP
r − αX
∗
SP −
(γK∗SP + 2γK + 2cP )K
∗
SP
2r
−I −K∗SP λ = 0
(50)
Proof of Proposition 4 follows the same steps as Proposition 2 and it is
given in Appendix A.4.
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3 Results
In this section, we present numerical results that allow us to evaluate and
compare ﬁndings in Section 2. The main aim of this section is to show
how changes in certain parameters aﬀect investment triggers and optimal
capacities. We focus on how these eﬀects diﬀer for the strategic ﬁrm and the
social planner. We further investigate for which parameters one technology
is to be chosen over the other.
The nature of our ﬁndings and the wide range of parameters we utilize neces-
sitate the use of numerical methods. We use the softwareMaple to obtain our
numerical results. One important point in our model is that, for the peakload
investment case, we might obtain multiple solutions to choose from. In such
cases, we simply choose the solution which returns the highest discounted
expected value for the total investment of both types of investors. Existence
of multiple solutions may result in jumps in some of the graphs we present
in the following section.
Another point regarding the graphs in this section is about the feasibility of
the investment decision. By nature, a ﬁrm would not make an investment if
the resulting expected value of that investment is negative. Therefore, in such
a case, the investment would not take place. For instance, as the installed ca-
pacity in the market prior to the investment increases, corresponding optimal
investment decision might return negative expected value. In such a situa-
tion, we conclude that the investment itself is not optimal and never takes
place, but for reasons of completeness we still present how the increase in the
installed capacity aﬀect the expected value even after it becomes negative.
To summarize our ﬁndings in this section, the strategic ﬁrm tends to invests
at a higher demand trigger level and lower capacity compared to the social
planner for both the baseload and peakload investment cases. Hence, the
strategic ﬁrm is expected to invest at a later date while incurring lower in-
vestment cost. For both types of investors, baseload generation is preferable
during low installed capacity and uncertainty cases whereas high installed
capacity and uncertainty tends to result in peakload generation. This result
points out that during the times of low uncertainty, the need for ﬂexible
generation is low as well. But for high uncertainty cases the peakload gener-
ation becomes more favorable as the ﬂexibility is more likely to be used by
suspending operation to avoid very low market prices.
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3.1 Impact of Cost Function
Table 1 shows that how the nature of investment cost function aﬀect in-
vestment triggers and capacities for the strategic ﬁrm and the social planner.
For concave investment cost, the cost of investing in capacity would be lower
than in the linear and convex cost cases. In other words, under concave in-
vestment cost, the cost of the marginal capacity is lower than the other two
cases. Therefore, we may expect to have higher level of capacity investment
from both types of investors for the concave investment cost case as it would
be cheaper to build generators. This intuition has also been underlined in
Hagspiel et al. (2010). Figure 1 supports this intuition as we observe the
level of investment to almost always decrease as the cost function becomes
more convex. When the investment takes place for relatively low levels of
demand shock trigger while we see very high levels of capacity investment
for both the strategic ﬁrm and social planner. However, as it becomes more
costly to invest, the investment is in general delayed for both cases and level
of investment decreases.6 We see that the diﬀerence in trigger and capaci-
ties decrease for both technologies and investor types as λ increases. These
results show that the extent of market power and the diﬀerence between the
optimal decisions of both types of investors diminishes as the investment in
new capacity becomes very costly.
6These ﬁndings are in line with Hagspiel et al. (2010) too.
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Figure 1: Investment Triggers and Capacities based on λ (For A = 0.5, K = 100,
I = 10000, cB = 80, c = 100 cP = 120 r = 0.1, α = 0.01, σ = 0.1 and γ = 0.1).
From Table 1, we further see that the strategic ﬁrm tends to invest at a
higher trigger level and at a lower capacity than the social planner. However
for high values of λ investment capacities for the strategic ﬁrm and the social
planner become very close. These ﬁndings are valid for both the baseload
and peakload generation investment cases. Furthermore when we focus on
both types of investors we observe that if the peakload generation is chosen
over the baseload generation, the investment capacity and the investment
trigger levels are higher. In other words, both types of investors waits longer,
invests in higher capacity and incurs a higher investment cost due to bigger
investment capacity if it chooses to invest in peakload capacity to enjoy
a more ﬂexible production. This result is mainly due to the high levels
of uncertainty that makes the peakload generation preferable and a higher
marginal cost of production. To beneﬁt most from the high uncertainty both
types of investors choose to delay investment and invest in bigger capacity.
We further discuss this issue and we investigate how the technology choice is
made in Section 3.4.
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Table 1: Investment Triggers and Capacities based on the nature of investment
cost (For A = 0.5, K = 100, I = 10000, cB = 80, c = 100 cP = 120 r = 0.1,
α = 0.01, σ = 0.1 and γ = 0.1).
Baseload plant Peakload plant
λ K∗SF K
∗
SP X
∗
SF X
∗
SP K
∗
SF K
∗
SP X
∗
SF X
∗
SP
0.50 513.97 942.52 178.02 165.83 717.29 1363.4 218.16 190.86
0.75 514.09 942.75 178.05 165.86 717.43 1364 218.25 190.83
1.00 514.38 943.4 178.18 166 717.74 1366.2 218.62 190.56
1.25 514.47 943.77 178.64 166.56 717.2 1371.5 220.24 188.86
1.50 508.68 927.88 180.11 168.62 705.06 1337.8 225.87 180.15
1.75 456.99 769.38 183.33 173.25 620.09 1072.1 237.92 232.7
2.00 274 339.3 184.14 172.61 354.08 448.87 244.8 236.04
2.25 116.98 121.39 184.46 173.52 139.34 145.65 242.16 231.69
2.50 57.585 57.729 194.19 184.88 64.423 64.753 248.72 239.53
2.75 34.169 34.056 211.17 202.89 36.827 36.75 263.96 255.72
3.00 22.994 22.906 232.39 224.72 24.235 24.158 284.18 276.52
3.25 16.82 16.763 256.12 248.82 17.481 17.429 307.25 299.96
3.50 13.04 13.003 281.27 274.23 13.428 13.393 331.95 324.9
4.00 8.811 8.7936 333.33 326.59 8.9758 8.9591 383.39 376.64
5.00 5.2757 5.27 435.05 428.58 5.3257 5.3202 484.45 477.97
6.00 3.8215 3.8188 526.27 519.92 3.8439 3.8413 575.33 568.97
3.2 Impact of Uncertainty
After we observe how the nature of the investment cost function aﬀects the
optimal investment decisions, we now focus on the comparison of the optimal
investment decisions of the strategic ﬁrm and the social planner for speciﬁc
levels of λ. In that regard, we extend Huisman and Kort (2012)’s results
which are just based on linear investment cost. Figure 2 reveals how in-
vestment triggers and optimal capacities change with the uncertainty (i.e.,
σ) under concave investment cost as λ = 0.5 (See Appendix for the ﬁgures
for λ = 1 and λ = 2). We can see that the demand triggers and the optimal
capacities tend to increase with the uncertainty for both types of investors.
These results are in line with the relevant literature (e.g., Dixit and Pindyck
(1994)) that high uncertainty increases the optimal capacity levels to beneﬁt
from possible high prices and it increases the incentive to delay investment
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to gather more information prior to the investment.
We see that when both types of investors choose to invest in peakload gener-
ator the optimal investment capacity will be higher than the corresponding
baseload generator investment. This strategy helps the strategic ﬁrm to gain
even higher revenues during the high demand periods. We further see from
the Figure 2 that for relatively low levels of uncertainty, the demand shock
trigger for the peakload generator case is higher. On the other hand, for
relatively high levels of uncertainty, investment in peakload generator would
occur at a lower demand shock trigger level. We have such a result because
the potential beneﬁts of ﬂexible peakload generation oﬀset the high invest-
ment and marginal costs during times of suﬃciently high levels of uncertainty.
Figure 2: Investment Triggers and Capacities based on uncertainty (For A = 0.5,
K = 100, I = 10000, cB = 80, c = 100 cP = 120 r = 0.1, α = 0.01, γ = 0.1 and
λ = 0.5).
3.3 Impact of Installed Capacity
In this section we investigate how the level of installed capacity aﬀects the
optimal investment decisions. We ﬁrst take a look at the optimal investment
triggers and capacities for the case of A = 0.5. Impact of the partial owner-
ship of the installed capacity in the market could only be considered eﬀective
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for the strategic ﬁrm case as the the social planner does not maximize the
proﬁts but the social surplus (Note that the derivation for the social planner
case does not contain the parameter A). Later, we also take a look into the
eﬀect of the value A itself on the optimal decisions.
Figure 3: Investment Triggers and Capacities based on installed capacity (For
A = 0.5, I = 10000, cB = 80, c = 100 cP = 120 r = 0.1, α = 0.01, σ = 0.1,
γ = 0.1 and λ = 2).
We see from Figure 3 that, except for the social planner’s peakload invest-
ment case, as the level of installed capacity, K, increases the investment
triggers and optimal capacities increase as well. We have such a result be-
cause higher levels of installed capacity results in lower market prices prior
to the new capacity investment. Hence the strategic ﬁrm and the social
planner choose to wait for higher market prices before the investment takes
place. In order to fully beneﬁt from the high market prices resulted by wait-
ing, the strategic ﬁrm and the social planner choose to increase the level of
new capacity as well. However for the social planner’s peakload investment
case, we have a slightly diﬀerent result. What we observe is, the investment
trigger and capacity increase with K up to some point. Afterwards, we see
see a downwards jump because when K is close to 200, the social planner
invests almost immediately at a very low capacity to maximize the expected
social surplus. This welfare maximizing decision can be seen more clearly in
Figure 4.
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Figure 4: Expected Proﬁt for the Strategic Firm and Social Surplus for the Social
Planner (For A = 0.5, I = 10000, cB = 80, c = 100 cP = 120 r = 0.1, α = 0.01,
σ = 0.1, γ = 0.1 and λ = 2).
Figure 4 shows that the strategic ﬁrms expected proﬁts has a tendency to
decrease with the level of installed capacity. This is simply because of the
increased level of installed capacity paired with the new capacity investment
driving the market price down. However for the social planner, we ﬁrst see
the expected social surplus to increase with the installed capacity up to some
point and decrease afterwards. This eﬀect is simply due to the increase in the
consumer surplus as the increase in the level of installed capacity drives the
market price down. When we further focus on the social planners expected
social surplus curve for peakload generation, we see a kink in the curve at
the same point we see the downwards jump in Figure 3. As was mentioned,
right until the moment of the kink, a ﬁrst set of solutions result in the
higher expected social surplus but after the kink a second set of solutions
start to provide even higher expected social surplus. Hence we observe a
jump in Figure 3 and a kink in Figure 4. Figure 4 also shows that the
expected proﬁts becomes negative for a lower level of installed capacity than
the social planner. As a result, for relatively high levels of installed capacity,
the investment may not be proﬁtable for the strategic ﬁrm whereas the social
planner may still choose to go ahead with the investment.
In Figure 5 below we see that the investment triggers and capacity levels
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increase with A for the strategic ﬁrm but not for the social planner. Because,
the social planner maximizes the total social surplus based on the total pro-
duction in the market. Therefore ownership of the installed capacity does
not have an impact on the social planner’s decision. On the other hand, as
the strategic ﬁrm owns more and more of the installed capacity in the mar-
ket, the investment is delayed and a higher level of capacity is chosen to be
invested. This behavior is observed for all values λ. This result is due to the
strategic ﬁrm’s reluctance to cannibalize its proﬁts from the installed capac-
ity. When the strategic ﬁrm owns more of the installed capacity, undertaking
an investment at low levels of demand will decrease the proﬁts from the in-
stalled capacity signiﬁcantly. Instead, the strategic ﬁrm waits the demand
to be relatively high before investment. And for high levels of demand, the
strategic ﬁrm becomes better oﬀ by investing in bigger capacities
Figure 5: Investment Triggers and Capacities based on installed capacity based
on A (For K = 100, I = 10000, cB = 80, c = 100 cP = 120 r = 0.1, α = 0.01,
σ = 0.1, γ = 0.1 and λ = 2).
The results we observe in Figure 5 have actually two opposing impacts
from welfare maximization point of view. We see from the Figure 5 that the
demand shock triggers move away from the socially optimal outcome whereas
the investment capacities move closer to their socially optimal counterparts.
We further see from the Figure 6 that there is an overall decrease in the total
social surplus with an increase in the ownership A. This result is natural due
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to the negative impact of the increase in the demand shock trigger dominating
the positive impact of the investment capacity. However this result does not
necessarily guarantee an increase in the proﬁts of the strategic ﬁrm. We can
see from Figure 6 that the ownership of the installed capacity is beneﬁcial
to the strategic ﬁrm only when it is paired with the ownership of a peakload
generator for λ = 2 case. Therefore we conclude that an increase in the
ownership of the total production in the market does not necessarily result
in higher proﬁts for the strategic ﬁrm.
Figure 6: Expected Proﬁt and Social Surplus for the Strategic Firm (For I =
10000, cB = 80, c = 100 cP = 120 r = 0.1, α = 0.01, σ = 0.1, γ = 0.1 and λ = 2).
3.4 Technology Choice
Until this point in this paper, we explored the idea of investing in diﬀerent
types of technologies exclusively. In other words, we separately investigated
what would happen if both types of investor invests either in baseload or
peakload technology. However, in a realistic scenario, both types of investors
would choose to invest in one technology over the other. In this section, by
focusing on the uncertainty parameter (σ), we explore to ﬁnd what will be
the technology choice for varying levels of σ.
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Our methodology in this section is simply to compare the discounted value
of the total assets for both types of investors. As mentioned before, to sim-
plify the determination of the technology choice, we compare the expected
discounted values of both technologies at time zero. Then both types of in-
vestors make their optimal technology choices, based on the evaluation of
their corresponding objectives. So, the strategic ﬁrm chooses to invest in
the technology that returns higher expected proﬁt whereas the social plan-
ner chooses to invest in the technology that returns higher expected social
surplus.
Figure 7: Expected Proﬁt for the Strategic Firm and Social Surplus for the Social
Planner (For A = 0.5, K = 100, I = 10000, cB = 80, c = 100 cP = 120 r = 0.1,
α = 0.01, σ = 0.1, γ = 0.1 and λ = 1).
Figure 7 shows how the expected discounted proﬁts change for the strategic
ﬁrm and the expected social surplus changes for the social planner for λ = 1.
We see that both the expected discounted proﬁts and social surpluses for both
technologies increase with uncertainty. Furthermore, for both the strategic
ﬁrm and the social planner cases, relatively low levels of uncertainty result in
an investment of baseload generation but relatively high levels of uncertainty
result in an investment of peakload generation. Straightforward justiﬁcation
of this ﬁnding is relatively low levels of σ makes the need for suspendible
production less likely. However as σ increases, the possibility of the need for
suspendible production makes the peakload investment preferable.
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We also see that an increase in σ increases the expected proﬁt and the ex-
pected social surplus exponentially. Furthermore we note that for lower lev-
els of λ, and therefore higher investment capacity and lower demand trigger,
the peakload generator beneﬁts more from increasing uncertainty than the
baseload generator. This eﬀect has a larger impact for lower λ levels and
makes the investor change preferences from one technology to another for
low uncertainty.
Figure 8: Expected Proﬁt for the Strategic Firm and Social Surplus for the Social
Planner (For A = 0.5, K = 100, I = 10000, cB = 80, c = 100 cP = 120 r = 0.1,
α = 0.01, σ = 0.1, γ = 0.1 and λ = 2).
Figure 8 gives the same plots for the λ = 2 case. We see that for the
corresponding range of the uncertainty, investing in baseload generation re-
turns higher expected proﬁts for the strategic ﬁrm and higher expected social
surplus for the social planner. Therefore for these cases, baseload technol-
ogy will always be the choice of technology when the investment takes place.
This result is mainly due to the value of λ. As we have mentioned previously,
choice of peakload generation results in higher capacity investment, higher
investment cost and higher production costs. Speciﬁcally the investment cost
increases signiﬁcantly for high levels of λ. And for the case in Figure 8, this
negative impact exceeds the beneﬁts of having a peakload generator. As a
result, we do not see the peakload generation providing higher returns for
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either the strategic ﬁrm or the social planner.7
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we compare the investment timing and investment capacity for
the optimal level of investment for a strategic ﬁrm and a social planner that
have a one-time opportunity to invest in two types of electricity generators.
In our model, the one-time investment decision requires the determination
of demand shock trigger level, choice of technology and level of optimal ca-
pacity. We speciﬁcally investigate how the investment triggers, optimal ca-
pacities and technology choices change with the changes to the investment
cost function, demand uncertainty and the level of installed capacity in the
market.
In the numerical results, we conﬁrm that increasing uncertainty tends to
delay the investment and increase the investment capacity for all the cases.
We also ﬁnd that the strategic ﬁrm tends to invest at a higher demand trigger
level and lower capacity compared to the social planner for both the baseload
and peakload investment cases. Hence, the strategic ﬁrm is expected to invest
at a later date while incurring lower investment costs. We additionally ﬁnd
that highly convex investment cost greatly diminishes the eﬀect of market
power on the investment decisions. Furthermore, we show that increased
share of production in the market for the strategic ﬁrm does not necessarily
increase its expected proﬁts.
Further investigation of the expected proﬁts for the strategic ﬁrm and the ex-
pected social surplus for the social planner reveals that, expected proﬁts for
the strategic ﬁrm almost always decrease with the level of installed capacity,
whereas expected social surplus for the social planner exhibits an increase
prior to declining due to high levels of installed capacity. The overview of the
expected returns, for both the strategic ﬁrm and the social planner, further
reveals that ﬁxed baseload generation is preferable during low uncertainty
cases whereas high uncertainty tends to result in the choice of ﬂexible peak-
load generation.
7Note that we require r− 2α−σ2 > 0 to have a ﬁnite value for the investment project.
In our numerical analysis, we have σ ≤ √r − 2α ≈ 0.2828. See also Dangl (1999).
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
In the proof of this Proposition, we use the same approach as Dangl (1999),
Hagspiel et al. (2010) and Huisman and Kort (2012) by ﬁnding the ﬁrst
order condition for the value function with respect to KSF .
8
∂
∂KSF
[
AK +K∗SF
r − α X −
(γ(A+ 1)K + γK∗SF + cB)K
∗
SF
r
− (γK + c)AK
r
−(I +K∗SF λ)
]
= 0
(51)
where the maximality of the solutions are provided by checking that the
second order derivate for corresponding solutions is less than zero.
Furthermore, (18) is found by using value matching and smooth pasting
conditions from (16). Namely,
BX∗SF
β +
AK
r − αX
∗
SF −
(γK + c)AK
r
=
AK +K∗SF
r − α X
∗
SF (52)
− (γ(A+ 1)K + γK
∗
SF + cB)K
∗
SF
r
− (γK + c)AK
r
− (I +K∗SF λ)
βBX∗SF
β−1 +
AK
r − α =
AK +K∗SF
r − α (53)
Combining these two equations implicitly gives X∗SF as,
β − 1
β
K∗SF
r − αX
∗
SF −
(γ(A+ 1)K + γK∗SF + cB)K
∗
SF
r
− I −K∗SF λ = 0 (54)
Note that, these equations are only suﬃcient conditions and the equations
may have multiple solutions that does not necessarily give the same expected
value since we can not derive a straightforward second order condition for
(51). But the propositions in this paper make it possible to determine a
8As the value-matching condition (52) suggests, maximizing the value function at
X = XSF
∗ maximizes the option value to invest at the same point.
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ﬁnite number of candidates, where the optimal solution returns the highest
expected value for the total assets.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
As before, the value function before the time of new peakload investment is
given by:
V (X) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
LXβ1 +
AK
r − αX −
(γK + c)AK
r
if X < X∗SF
DXβ2 +
AK +K∗SF
r − α X −
(γK + c)AK
r
− (I +K∗SF λ) if X = X∗SF
−(γ(A+ 1)K + γK
∗
SF + cP )K
∗
SF
r
where X∗SF is the trigger demand shock level that the investment in new
peakload capacity takes place, DXβ2 is the option value to suspend operation
and LXβ1 is the option value to invest. Furthermore, β1 > 1 and β2 < 0 are
the roots of the quadratic equation:
1
2
σ2β2 +
(
α− 1
2
σ2
)
β − r = 0. (55)
(28) is found by deriving the value function at the time of investment with
respect to KSF . So, we evaluate;
∂
∂KSF
[
D(KSF )X
∗
SF
β2 +
AK +K∗SF
r − α X
∗
SF −
(γ(A+ 1)K + γK∗SF + cP )K
∗
SF
r
−(γK + c)AK
r
− (I +K∗SF λ)
]
= 0
(56)
where the maximality of the solutions are provided by checking that the
second order derivate for corresponding solutions is less than zero.
(29) is found by using value matching and smooth pasting conditions from
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the value function before the investment (27). Hence,
LX∗SF
β1 +
AK
r − αX
∗
SF −
(γK + c)AK
r
= DX∗SF
β2 +
AK +K∗SF
r − α X
∗
SF (57)
− (γ(A+ 1)K + γK
∗
SF + cP )K
∗
SF
r
− (γK + c)AK
r
− (I +K∗SF λ)
β1LX
∗
SF
β1−1 +
AK
r − α = β2DX
∗
SF
β2−1 +
AK +K∗SF
r − α (58)
Furthermore, constants C and D are found by using value matching and
smooth pasting conditions from the value function after the investment, (25).
Hence,
CXSF
β1 +
AK
r − αXSF −
(γK + c)AK
r
= DXSF
β2 +
AK +K∗SF
r − α XSF
− (γ(A+ 1)K + γK
∗
SF + cP )K
∗
SF
r
− (γK + c)AK
r
(59)
β1CXSF
β1−1 +
AK
r − α = β2DXSF
β2−1 +
AK +K∗SF
r − α (60)
Combining these two equations implicitly gives:
C =
(γ(A+ 1)K + γK∗SF + cP )K
∗
SF
r
β2
β2 − β1XSF
−β1 +
1− β2
β2 − β1
K∗SF
r − αX
1−β1
SF
(61)
D =
(γ(A+ 1)K + γK∗SF + cP )K
∗
SF
r
β1
β1 − β2XSF
−β2 +
1− β1
β1 − β2
K∗SF
r − αX
1−β2
SF
(62)
The parameters C,D, and D′ can be simpliﬁed by using the following ex-
pressions:
XSF = γ(A+ 1)K + γKSF + cP and
β1β2
(β2 − 1)(β1 − 1) =
r
r − α (63)
Therefore, we have:
C =
β2
(β1 − β2)(β1 − 1)
K∗SF
r
X1−β1SF (64)
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D =
β1
(β2 − β1)(β2 − 1)
K∗SF
r
X1−β2SF (65)
D′(K∗SF ) =
β1
(β2 − β1)(β2 − 1)
1
r
X1−β2SF −
γβ1
β2 − β1
K∗SF
r
X−β2SF (66)
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
In the proof of this Proposition, we use the same approach as Proposition
1 by ﬁnding the ﬁrst order condition for the value function with respect to
KSP .
∂
∂KSP
[
K +K∗SP
r − α X −
γ(K +K∗SP )
2 + 2cK + 2cBK
∗
SP
2r
− (I +K∗SP λ)
]
= 0
(67)
where the maximality of the solutions are provided by checking that the
second order derivate for corresponding solutions is less than zero.
Furthermore, (43) is found by using value matching and smooth pasting
conditions from (40). Namely,
GX∗SP
β +
K
r − αX
∗
SP −
γK2 + 2cK
2r
=
K +KSP
r − α X
∗
SP − (I +K∗SP λ)
− γ(K +KSP )
2 + 2cK + 2cBKSP
2r
(68)
βGX∗SP
β−1 +
K
r − α =
K +K∗SP
r − α (69)
Combining these two equations implicitly gives X∗SP as,
β − 1
β
K∗SPX
∗
SP
r − α −
(2γK + γKSP + 2cB)K
∗
SP
2r
− I −K∗SP λ = 0 (70)
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A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
As before, the value function before the time of new peakload investment is
given by:
W (X) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
MXβ1 +
K
r − αX −
γK2 + 2cK
2r
if X < X∗SP
JXβ2 +
K +KSP
r − α X −
γK2 + 2cK
2r
− (I +K∗SP λ) if X = X∗SP
−(γK
∗
SP + 2γK + 2cP )K
∗
SP
2r
where X∗SP is the trigger demand shock level that the investment in new
peakload capacity takes place, JXβ2 is the option value to suspend operation
and MXβ1 is the option value to invest. Furthermore, β1 > 1 and β2 < 0 are
the roots of the quadratic equation:
1
2
σ2β2 +
(
α− 1
2
σ2
)
β − r = 0. (71)
(49) is found by deriving the value function at the time of investment with
respect to KSP . So, we evaluate;
∂
∂KSF
[
J(KSP )X
∗
SP
β2 +
K +KSP
r − α X
∗
SP −
(γK∗SP + 2γK + 2cP )K
∗
SP
2r
−γK
2 + 2cK
2r
− (I +K∗SP λ)
]
= 0
(72)
where the maximality of the solutions are provided by checking that the
second order derivate for corresponding solutions is less than zero.
(50) is found by using value matching and smooth pasting conditions from
the value function before the investment (48). Namely,
MX∗SP
β1 +
K
r − αX
∗
SP −
γK2 + 2cK
2r
= JX∗SP
β2 +
K +KSP
r − α X
∗
SP (73)
− (γK
∗
SP + 2γK + 2cP )K
∗
SP
2r
− γK
2 + 2cK
2r
− (I +K∗SP λ)
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β1MX
∗
SP
β1−1 +
K
r − α = β2DX
∗
SP
β2−1 +
K +K∗SF
r − α (74)
Furthermore, constants J and H are found by using value matching and
smooth pasting conditions from (44). Hence,
MXSP
β1 +
K
r − αXSP −
γK2 + 2cK
2r
= JXSP
β2 +
K +KSP
r − α XSP
− (γK
∗
SP + 2γK + 2cP )K
∗
SP
2r
− γK
2 + 2cK
2r
(75)
β1MXSP
β1−1 +
K
r − α = β2JXSP
β2−1 +
K +K∗SP
r − α (76)
Combining these two equations implicitly gives:
J =
(γK∗SP + 2γK + 2cP )K
∗
SP
2r
β1
β1 − β2XSP
−β2 +
1− β1
β1 − β2
K∗SP
r − αX
1−β2
SP (77)
H =
(γK∗SP + 2γK + 2cP )K
∗
SP
2r
β2
β2 − β1XSP
−β1 +
1− β2
β2 − β1
K∗SP
r − αX
1−β1
SP (78)
The parameters H, J , and J ′ can be simpliﬁed by using the following expres-
sions:
XSP = γK + cP +
γ
2
KSP and
β1β2
(β2 − 1)(β1 − 1) =
r
r − α (79)
Therefore, we have:
H =
β2
(β1 − β2)(β1 − 1)
K∗SP
r
X1−β1SP (80)
J =
β1
(β2 − β1)(β2 − 1)
K∗SP
r
X1−β2SP (81)
J ′(K∗SP ) =
β1
(β2 − β1)(β2 − 1)
1
r
X1−β2SP −
γ
2
β1
β2 − β1
K∗SP
r
X−β2SP (82)
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A.5 Additional Figures
A.5.1 Impact of Cost Function
Figure 9: Expected Proﬁt for the Strategic Firm and Social Surplus for the Social
Planner based on λ (For A = 0.5, K = 100, I = 10000, cB = 80, c = 100 cP = 120
r = 0.1, α = 0.01, σ = 0.1 and γ = 0.1).
A.5.2 Impact of Uncertainty
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Figure 10: Investment Triggers and Capacities based on uncertainty (For A =
0.5, K = 100, I = 10000, cB = 80, c = 100 cP = 120 r = 0.1, α = 0.01, γ = 0.1
and λ = 1).
Figure 11: Investment Triggers and Capacities based on uncertainty (For A =
0.5, K = 100, I = 10000, cB = 80, c = 100 cP = 120 r = 0.1, α = 0.01, γ = 0.1
and λ = 2).
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A.5.3 Impact of Installed Capacity
• For λ = 0.5:
Figure 12: Investment Triggers and Capacities based on installed capacity (For
A = 0.5, I = 10000, cB = 80, c = 100 cP = 120 r = 0.1, α = 0.01, σ = 0.1,
γ = 0.1 and λ = 0.5).
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Figure 13: Expected Proﬁt for the Strategic Firm and Social Surplus for the Social
Planner (For A = 0.5, I = 10000, cB = 80, c = 100 cP = 120 r = 0.1, α = 0.01,
σ = 0.1, γ = 0.1 and λ = 0.5).
Figure 14: Investment Triggers and Capacities based on installed capacity based
on A (For K = 100, I = 10000, cB = 80, c = 100 cP = 120 r = 0.1, α = 0.01,
σ = 0.1, γ = 0.1 and λ = 0.5).
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Figure 15: Expected Proﬁt and Social Surplus for the Strategic Firm (For I =
10000, cB = 80, c = 100 cP = 120 r = 0.1, α = 0.01, σ = 0.1, γ = 0.1 and
λ = 0.5).
• For λ = 1:
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Figure 16: Investment Triggers and Capacities based on installed capacity (For
A = 0.5, I = 10000, cB = 80, c = 100 cP = 120 r = 0.1, α = 0.01, σ = 0.1,
γ = 0.1 and λ = 1).
Figure 17: Expected Proﬁt for the Strategic Firm and Social Surplus for the Social
Planner (For A = 0.5, I = 10000, cB = 80, c = 100 cP = 120 r = 0.1, α = 0.01,
σ = 0.1, γ = 0.1 and λ = 1).
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Figure 18: Investment Triggers and Capacities based on installed capacity based
on A (For K = 100, I = 10000, cB = 80, c = 100 cP = 120 r = 0.1, α = 0.01,
σ = 0.1, γ = 0.1 and λ = 1).
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Figure 19: Expected Proﬁt and Social Surplus for the Strategic Firm (For I =
10000, cB = 80, c = 100 cP = 120 r = 0.1, α = 0.01, σ = 0.1, γ = 0.1 and λ = 1).
A.5.4 Technology Choice
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Figure 20: Expected Proﬁt for the Strategic Firm and Social Surplus for the Social
Planner (For A = 0.5, K = 100, I = 10000, cB = 80, c = 100 cP = 120 r = 0.1,
α = 0.01, σ = 0.1, γ = 0.1 and λ = 0.5).
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Conclusion
This dissertation presents three chapters that deals with the short and long
term impacts of market power in the electricity markets. The dissertation
primarily adopts a real options approach to analyze the short and long term
decisions that are at least partially irreversible. The main contribution of the
dissertation is to investigate the eﬀects of market power when the strategic
producers own a portfolio of generation technologies and have ability to aﬀect
prices while facing demand or production uncertainties.
The ﬁrst chapter studies the eﬀects of operational characteristics of power
plants on optimal dispatch decisions and estimation of market power. Specif-
ically, I give a real options model to show how operational characteristics of
power plants and market uncertainty aﬀect start up and shut down decisions.
Furthermore, I derive start up and shut down trigger levels of the peakload
generator for both monopoly and social planner cases. These trigger levels
are obtained numerically due to the nature of the real options model.
I show that in the case of ownership of multiple generation technologies, opti-
mal dispatch decisions cause capacity withholding for the peakload generator
in both the monopoly and the social planner cases. Due to higher start up
and shut down trigger levels, the monopolist is expected to keep the peakload
generator active for a signiﬁcantly shorter period of time compared to the
social planner. Moreover, the diﬀerence between the start up trigger prices
for the social planner and the marginal cost reveals signiﬁcant levels of real
options premium. Under the existence of start up and shut down costs, the
real options premium takes values of more than 30% of the marginal cost of
the peakload generator. Additionally, for both ﬁxed and ﬂexible peakload
generation cases, the real options premium explains about 24% to 30% of the
monopolists mark-up. Furthermore, the real options-adjusted Lerner Index
shows that an increase in start up trigger prices does not necessarily mean
an increase in the extent of market power of the monopolist.
The second chapter investigates the short term eﬀects of wind generator
ownership by the owners of fossil-fueled peakload generators. I provide a
Cournot oligopoly model to show the eﬀects on the individual and total
peakload production levels as well as the market price.
Theoretical derivations in this chapter show that wind generator ownership
results in signiﬁcantly lower total peakload production and higher market
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price. Moreover, every peakload ﬁrm is inﬂuenced by the aggregate wind
generator ownership. In that regard, while the ﬁrms without wind gen-
erators increase their peakload production, the ﬁrms with wind generators
decrease theirs. Furthermore, by internalizing their share of wind generation,
peakload ﬁrms decrease their total production costs and earn higher proﬁts.
In addition, when all wind generators are owned by the peakload ﬁrms, the
impact of wind generation on the market outcomes vanishes. I further ﬁnd
that the peakload ﬁrms that own wind generators ask higher start up and
shut down prices under higher levels of wind generator ownership. I addi-
tionally show that the eﬀect of the volatility of the wind generation on the
expected consumer, producer and total social surpluses decreases with the
aggregate wind generation ownership due to internalization of the wind gen-
eration. Finally, further analysis documents that a feed-in premium support
scheme does not aﬀect the peakload ﬁrms production levels and hence the
market outcomes. However, there is an increase in the total production and
a decrease in the market price under a feed-in tariﬀ type of support scheme.
The third chapter compares the investment timing and the optimal level of
investment for a hypothetical monopolist and a social planner that have a
one-time opportunity to invest in a generator with either ﬁxed or ﬂexible
production. It speciﬁcally investigates how the investment triggers, optimal
capacities and technology choices change with the changes to the investment
cost function, demand uncertainty and the level of installed capacity in the
market.
In the numerical results, we conﬁrm that increasing uncertainty tends to
delay the investment and increase the investment capacity for all the cases.
We also ﬁnd that the strategic ﬁrm tends to invest at a higher demand trigger
level and lower capacity compared to the social planner for both the baseload
and peakload investment cases. Hence, the strategic ﬁrm is expected to invest
at a later date while incurring lower investment costs. We additionally ﬁnd
that highly convex investment cost greatly diminishes the eﬀect of market
power on the investment decisions. We also ﬁnd that with increased levels of
installed capacity and installed capacity ownership, the strategic ﬁrm delays
the new investment and increases the new investment capacity. Furthermore,
we show that increased share of production in the market for the strategic
ﬁrm does not necessarily increase its expected proﬁts.
Further investigation of the expected proﬁts for the strategic ﬁrm and the
expected social surplus for the social planner reveals that, expected proﬁts
110
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for the strategic ﬁrm tends to decrease with the level of installed capacity,
whereas expected social surplus for the social planner exhibits an increase
prior to declining due to high levels of installed capacity. The overview of the
expected returns, for both the strategic ﬁrm and the social planner, further
reveals that ﬁxed baseload generation is preferable during low uncertainty
cases whereas high uncertainty tends to result in the choice of ﬂexible peak-
load generation.
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